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FINANCING COMPANIES IN GENERAL AND AT TE AROHA 
IN PARTICULAR 
 
Abstract: Those investing in mining companies were, wisely, warned to 
tread warily to avoid being duped by ‘wild cat’ promotions, for many 
companies were blatant speculations and most would fail. The three main 
causes of failures were misrepresentation of the value of the ore, over-
capitalization combined with insufficient working capital, and 
mismanagement. Mining investment was a form of gambling, with 
professional speculators seeking quick profits not long-term rewards. 
Companies were floated on the basis of inadequate prospecting, and some 
flotations were unquestionably fraudulent.  
Laws creating no or limited liability companies were designed to protect 
investors, but they encouraged floating companies with inadequate capital. 
Issuing partly paid-up shares required shareholders to pay calls, but often 
they preferred to forfeit their interests; and sometimes dummies were used to 
avoid payment.  
Despite claims of having found good ore, much unproven ground was 
floated, and share prices fluctuated depending on the latest reports of ore 
values. Fraudulent or at best exaggerated assay results were produced, for 
often samples did not reflect the general values. Examples are cited of how to 
salt mines or provide misleading assays and of companies shepherding their 
properties in the hope of nearby companies making good discoveries and 
enabling them to sell their ground for an unearned profit.  
Management was an expensive cost, especially in overseas companies, 
but insufficient money was provided to prospect and develop ground. Press 
‘puffery’ was condemned, but newspapers relied on information provided by 
mine managers. Surveyors sometimes produced plans showing reefs that did 
not exist, and many ‘experts’ imported from overseas were selected to produce 
the optimistic reports that company promoters required. Examples are cited 
of deliberately false reports and dubious prospectuses listing carefully 
selected shareholders’ names to attract investors. And in some cases 
companies even had either no title or an insecure one to the ground being 
floated. 
As stockbrokers could not be trusted, there was opposition to brokers 
being directors. Nor could miners always be trusted, as they played the 
market also. Overselling and forward selling of shares were problems, but 
the main ones were that under-capitalized companies had insufficient 
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working capital: several examples are cited. Some companies were over-
capitalized, and it was common to erect expensive plants prematurely. 
Because only a small percentage of the nominal capital was paid up, 
companies had to rely on calls to increase their capital. And vendors and 
company promoters made excessive profits from floating mines. 
In short, company flotation was more a form of gambling than a way of 
enabling honest mining. 
 
HOW TO FORM A COMPANY 
 
A South Island journalist visiting Waiorongomai in 1883 explained 
how mining companies were formed: 
 
One or more men peg off a section of ground; after prospecting for 
many weeks, or months, on discovering a gold-bearing reef they 
seek to form their claim into a company, which is done by 
creating, say, twenty prospectors’ shares, and on the formation of 
a Joint Stock Company [these] represent generally 20,000 shares, 
of £1 each, a portion of which, say one-fourth, is sold on the 
company’s account for further working the mine, whilst say half 
the shares are sold to defray expenses incurred in prospecting the 
claim, and the other fourth retained by the original discoverers.1 
 
ADVICE TO INVESTORS 
 
In 1892, those who had not previously invested in mining were given 
good advice by ‘Obadiah’, a weekly mining and investment columnist, who 
highlighted some of the pitfalls of the Auckland sharemarket:  
 
Many people seem to believe that a mining “ring” exists in 
Auckland, and that any unfortunate that goes into mining 
speculation is sure to be left lamenting. This is all nonsense, and 
if mining speculators would act with some sense, and be satisfied, 
as in other speculations, they would not be so often left to mind 
the baby. Take a friend’s advice as follows: - 
Avoid wild cats and all new ventures, unless you are satisfied 
that the company is likely to be successful in raising funds when 
wanted.  
When you purchase scrip, register the transaction at once, as by 
so doing you will help to keep shares firm and stop what is now 
being done to a large extent. When there is a run on shares, old 
                                            
1 Own Correspondent, ‘From Christchurch to Te Aroha’, Star, 24 October 1883, p. 3. 
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transfers that have not seen daylight for months, with names 
that are considered good, are passed round, and as a consequence 
shares are looked on with suspicion owing to the supposed seller’s 
name being well known, while in fact the name at bottom of 
transfer may have been put there twelve months before. The 
effect on the market of certain individuals being supposed to be 
sellers is not good, and often frightens timid dealers in stock. 
When a call is made, pay it, as mining cannot be carried on 
satisfactorily on overdrafts. Bank accommodation has to be paid 
for, and several good companies had to be wound up last year 
through shareholders not stumping up when called upon. Bad 
call-payers are a nuisance, and there are lots of them in 
Auckland. 
Do not buy shares because they happen to be low-priced, but stick 
to gold-producing mines. Auckland is not quite so large as 
London, and cannot run so many companies as has been done in 
the past with the amount of gold being got. 
When you sell, see that your name is removed from the register. 
Hold your broker responsible for this. It will save you trouble, the 
company expense, and perhaps keep you out of the hands of that 
heartless cuss, the liquidator. 
Never buy on time [payment], as it just helps to rig the market 
against yourself, and it is about 20 to 1 that you get left. 
Do not fancy that you know more than your broker, if you have 
one. If you haven’t one, get one; there are plenty of decent brokers 
on ’Change, whose business it is to keep their clients posted. 
Take no notice of the sensational telegrams posted by some 
managers. Remember that it takes a good many pounds of picked 
stone to pay a dividend, after working expenses. 
When you get the “straight tip” from experts, avoid their advice 
as you would that of a disqualified jockey, for they know less than 
he does of the business. 
Finally, “keep up your pecker,” and do not be discouraged by an 
occasional small loss. Fortune favours the brave.2 
 
In 1895, Edwin Edwards,3 a Paeroa newspaper editor who for a time 
during the boom was a mining agent,4 explained how companies were 
floated: 
                                            
2 ‘Better than Gold and Silver: Obadiah’s Advice for 1892’, Observer, 9 January 1892, p. 15. 
3 See paper on the Thames Miners’ Union. 
4 Edwin Edwards to Minister of Mines, 11 June 1888, Mines Department, MD 1, 88/471, 
ANZ-W; Observer, ‘Obadiah’, ‘Shares and Mining’, 7 September 1895, p. 17, 14 September 
1895, p. 9, photograph, 7 December 1895, p. 3, 5 June 1909, p. 5; Cyclopedia of New 
Zealand, vol. 2, p. 844; Te Aroha News, 3 June 1909, p. 2. 
4 
 
There must, first of all, exist the ground. The prospector finds or 
knows of a reef or reefs therein. We will say he lives in 
Karangahake. Very well, he comes to Paeroa to a mining agent, 
whose word is respected by Auckland people. He tells the Paeroa 
man of a certain reef he knows, satisfies him that it is unoccupied 
ground at the Warden’s office, and the pair, perhaps with an 
expert, then inspect the ground together. Tests are made by 
mortar and assay, and, if satisfactory, the Paeroa man produces 
his cheque-book and secures the ground. Usually the interest 
given for securing the lease is from one-third to one-half the 
ground. The agent, having secured the area, then approaches the 
Auckland market. Knowing the speculative one (they knowing 
him) he produces his report, including the result of tests and 
assays. Then, if the circle of this particular agent is satisfied, the 
claim in syndicated into a certain number of shares. Usually the 
promoters retain out of, say, sixty shares, twenty-five; from five to 
sixteen shares are reserved for the benefit of the claim, and the 
balance, twenty-five or thirty shares, are offered to the public, 
usually at £25 per share. This money, less brokerage, five per 
cent, is placed to the credit of the syndicate, and the next step is 
to call a meeting to form a Company. At this meeting directors 
are appointed and the Company formed, usually at 1000 scrip to 
the share, to properly test the ground. The no-liability clause of 
the Mining Act is most in vogue, because then one knows the 
extent of one’s liabilities. The number of scrip owned by each 
original holder is then set against his name, are registered and 
published, and the owner of the scrip can then give his orders to 
sell to any broker.5 
 
This was how reputable companies were reputably floated; as shown 
below, very often promoters did not follow this template, except in 
appearance, and investors often failed to distinguish, or were not bothered 
to distinguish, between a viable proposal and a wild cat. A 1909 cartoon 
repeated a constant message: ‘Advice to Mining Investors: Beware of the 
Wild Cat’;6 a message constantly ignored by many. 
 
RISKS 
 
                                            
5 ‘Diamond Drill’ [Edwin Edwards], Ohinemuri Gazette, n.d. [June 1895], reprinted in 
Thames Advertiser, 24 June 1895, p. 3. 
6 ‘Advice to Mining Investors: Beware of the Wild Cat’ (cartoon), Auckland Weekly News, 22 
July 1909, Supplement, p. 14. 
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William Welton, an English mining engineer who, in 1902, published 
an assessment of the financing of goldmining throughout the world, cited 
experienced men warning that it was ‘the very quintessence of speculative 
investment’, for the majority of mining companies failed. Although ore 
bodies could ‘pinch out’ and, especially, lose value at depth, the main cause 
of failures was ‘the fault of man, not of nature’.7 It was commonly agreed 
that there were three causes of failures: 
 
1st. Misrepresentation of the value of the properties from 
ignorance or design. 
2nd. Over-capitalization and want of working capital. 
3rd. Mismanagement and ignorance of mining.8 
 
He believed that ‘by far the largest number of companies’ failed 
‘through endeavouring to work at a profit without due appreciation of the 
special difficulties to be encountered, and basing their calculations of 
probable results upon what is being done at other mines working under 
totally different conditions’.9 To limit failures, it had been recommended 
that, before promoters floated properties, they should be required to pay for 
an inspection by a competent mining inspector, who must certify the 
property ‘was as represented’ and ‘reasonably worth the value placed upon 
it’ before a prospectus could be issued.10 Welton was not convinced. ‘The 
business of a seller of property is to get the most he can for it by presenting 
its special points in the most favourable light, and if the purchaser will not 
be guided by the experience of those who are capable of valuing what is 
offered for sale, he may expect to pay an exorbitant price’. No guarantee 
could be given that any mining engineer, however well qualified, could 
‘apply their knowledge’ or be ‘of calm, judicious mind, and fearless in giving 
their opinions’. Whilst examination by an independent engineer could have 
‘considerable value’, he warned that ‘some men are of more hopeful or 
excitable dispositions than others’.11 
 
                                            
7 William S. Welton, Practical Gold-Mining: Its commercial aspects: A collection of statistics 
and data relating to gold-mining and gold-mining finance companies (London, 1902), pp. 
42, 44. 
8 Welton, p. 45. 
9 Welton, p. 46. 
10 Welton, p. 43. 
11 Welton, pp. 45-46. 
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SPECULATION AS GAMBLING 
 
It is not certain to whom the Te Aroha News was referring in a 
sarcastic paragraph published in March 1909: 
 
Once again frantic efforts are being made by the head of a 
“payable? concern” not a thousand miles from Te Aroha to induce 
individuals with abundance of spare capital to invest. The 
number of times this particular individual has managed to get 
hold of the spending of other people’s spare cash is something 
astonishing, each time with the same result. “It doesn’t matter 
who sinks as long as I swim” appears to be the policy of this 
budding [Andrew] Carnegie.12 
 
To attract capital, the end justified the means, and throughout the 
history of mining in New Zealand concern was expressed about the tactics 
used. Selling interests was made easier by ‘the ignorance of the vast 
majority of holders of mining shares’ was ‘proverbial’.13 Charles Thatcher, 
‘the goldfield balladeer’, after performing at Thames in 1869 described how 
investors were enticed: 
 
Auriferous ground is taken possession of by a party of diggers, 
who, instead of selfishly working it on their own account, 
generously insist on admitting the public to partake of the 
benefits of the discovery. The claim is divided into several 
thousand shares, and it is the object of the benevolent promoters 
to get it into the market, and induce the public to invest in the 
scrip. The manager, if he is wide-awake, generally contrives to 
get a decent quantity of gold out of the first crushing; the result 
is, that a small dividend is declared, and shares go up in 
consequence. A mining manager is a curious being; he professes 
to know where gold exists in large quantities. He tells 
shareholders it is a certain fortune, and provided the ground is 
within a reasonable distance of the Golden Crown, say three 
miles, he can trace the leader coming into the claim.14 
 
In 1896, another commentator noted that sometimes ‘the sole claim to 
value of ground is vicinity to some favourite mine. Vicinity is a good asset if 
                                            
12 Te Aroha News, 11 March 1909, p. 2. 
13 Observer, 10 February 1900, p. 15. 
14 Robert Hoskins, Goldfield Balladeer: The life and times of the celebrated Charles R. 
Thatcher (Auckland, 1977), p. 116. 
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it means within the run of reefs, or within the auriferous belt; but if it is 
east or west of such belt it might be clean away from gold’.15 
In 1883, a Thames correspondent, noting how the value of shares in 
one mine fluctuated considerably, could not ‘understand how the finding of 
a few pounds of golden stone in any of the mines here will prove an 
incentive to people to buy scrip’, because they knew ‘the patchy nature of 
our ore’.16 One commentator regretted that investors in mining  
 
were regarded much in the same light as those engaged in horse 
racing, where the odds are terribly long against the public, and 
what should be regarded as the premier industry in these colonies 
has been degraded through the cunning and knavish tricks of 
loafers and schemers, and looked upon a little better than 
gambling.17 
 
Gold fever affected the brain: when the fit was on, ‘reason and 
argument are alike of little avail. We have, alas, known of several instances 
where men of keen business capabilities have gone off on a tangent, and 
entered into schemes of the most visionary description, to their sorrow and 
cost’.18 A Thames newspaper argued that nine out of ten investors had no 
way of distinguishing sound ventures from wild cats, deploring the latter 
not only for the capital wasted but because they deprived the industry ‘of 
ten or a hundred times that amount by reason of the suspicion they 
create’.19 A Thames Advertiser editorial in mid-1880 argued that ‘all 
enterprises’ were ‘more or less of a speculative character’, with mining 
‘believed to be the most hazardous’. Investors ‘at a distance’ could  
 
exercise no sort of personal supervision. Investors in mines 
require to satisfy themselves, if possible, beyond a peradventure 
on some points. Is the particular mine meritorious, and the 
management in the hands of honest and competent men? It 
frequently happens that companies are organised on worthless 
                                            
15 ‘The Warrigal’, ‘The North Island Goldfields: The Mining Boom’, Mining Standard, 14 
August 1896, p. 2. 
16 Thames Correspondent, Freeman’s Journal, 13 July 1883, p. 7. 
17 Thomas M. Humphreys, Handbook of the Auckland Goldfields, New Zealand (Auckland, 
1888), p. 18. 
18 Humphreys, p. 26. 
19 Editorial, Thames Star, 12 March 1891, p. 2. 
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properties, and sometimes left in the hands of incompetent men 
to manage. 
 
If the property was good and the management honest, mining was 
‘divested of many hazardous features, made legitimate as an investment, 
and often most lucrative’. But many ventures started on a false basis. 
Should good gold be found, there were ‘not wanting those who take 
advantage of such a discovery to pounce upon the unoccupied ground for 
miles around and claim for it the continuation of a rich line of reef, capable 
of development into something excelling the discovery which gave it birth’. 
As part of the ‘ups and downs of goldfields speculation’, sometimes this 
ground, with ‘capital and enterprise’, would become equally valuable. 
Because not all promoters were ‘honourable men’, the field had ‘suffered 
incalculable injury and depreciation consequent upon the greed of 
individuals who have not hesitated to proclaim the virtues of a piece of 
worthless country in order to “make a rise” ’. The ‘number of those who prey 
upon their fellow-men’ in this way had been ‘reduced to a minimum, and 
there were ‘so many legitimate openings that the rank swindle finds no 
place in our investment’. Nevertheless, care was necessary ‘to avoid 
wasteful expenditure’ and ‘prevent the creation of a host of ventures which 
can only benefit certain promoters, and leave those who patronise them 
lamenting the absence of honesty of intention, which too often characterises 
the work of floating companies’.  
 
It is not a desire to open up new mines and assist in the 
development of the district which prompts many of those whose 
names we see appended to nearly every memorial of registration 
of a new company, but a variety of influences, all ending in 
temporary profit. They take the earliest opportunity of realising, 
and leave the unwary to stand the brunt of calls, winding-up 
orders, or compromises with unfortunate creditors. The 
multiplication of such companies, under these circumstances, 
retards rather than benefits the field.20 
 
In the following year, when Te Aroha miners sought capital to erect a 
battery, an editorial in the Waikato Times noted that public confidence in 
goldfield investment had, ‘in not a few instances, been grossly abused’. 
While accepting that reefs appeared and disappeared ‘without the slightest 
apparent cause, so far as geological phenomenon indicates, or scientific 
                                            
20 Editorial, Thames Advertiser, 19 July 1880, p. 2. 
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research can detect’, it was concerned about ‘bubble schemes and “duffer” 
companies promoted by unscrupulous “speculators” and the professional 
goldfields harpie’, who salted reefs and produced ‘spurious specimens’. It 
appeared ‘as if the arch-fiend himself had been at work, so barefaced and 
unscrupulous have proceedings of this class, from time to time, been 
rendered’.21 As H. wrote in 1872, the mining speculator was a ‘sharp man’ 
who made money from sudden rises and falls in the market. ‘He looks not to 
distant prospects or deferred dividends. His object is to see a moving market 
and in the every-day chances of dropping upon a frenzied buyer, or panic-
struck holder of stock, he secures his dividends’. Mining speculators were 
‘easily led’, being ‘either in a fever-heat of excitement or their hearts are 
down to zero’.22 As Geoffrey Blainey has noted, ‘share prices have to 
fluctuate continually if they are to lure the speculator, who invests in the 
hope of a quick change in the market value of his shares’.23 Speculators 
would sometimes obtain shares on credit;24 a dangerous practice prompted 
by the hope of instant profit. A leading mine manager and mining reporter, 
John McCombie,25 described the psychology of ‘small men’ who invested in 
mining: 
 
There are quite a number of men who will work patiently for a 
lifetime in order to build up a business for the purpose of gaining 
a small pittance towards their support in old age, or to give their 
children a better start in life than they had themselves, and yet 
when these very men happen to invest a few dollars in a gold 
mining venture, they want “big returns” straight away, 
development or no development, and a whole legion of failures in 
gold mining may be attributed to unreasonable grasping greed of 
this description.26 
 
                                            
21 Editorial, Waikato Times, 15 January 1881, p. 2. 
22 H., ‘Our Mines, Speculators, and Future Prospects’, Auckland Weekly News, 17 February 
1872, p. 22. 
23 Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How distance shaped Australian history 
(Melbourne, 1966), p. 226. 
24 For instance, Frederick Alexander Whitaker: Thames Warden’s Court, Register of Deeds 
1869, folios 324-325, BACL 14417/4a, ANZ-A. 
25 See paper on Billy Nicholl. 
26 ‘Aboriginal’, ‘The Treatment of Gold and Silver-Bearing Ores’, Auckland Weekly News, 
26 November 1892, p. 35. 
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Little if anything had changed by the 1930s, as the Under-Secretary of 
Mines explained in a confidential letter to the chairman of the Bondholders 
Incorporation Commission. The first of his concerns was ‘exploitation by 
option holders’, as explained in an imaginary case ‘typical of many mining 
transactions’: 
 
An impecunious miner acting on his own initiative or as a 
“dummy” pegs off an area of Crown land in an auriferous district, 
and applies to the Warden’s Court for a Prospecting License over 
same. This license may cost him say £10 for legal and other 
expenses and entitles him to prospect the area for gold. The life of 
the license is twelve months, but with it goes the right of priority 
to obtain a further Prospecting License over the area for a further 
twelve months or to apply for a claim. The license holder is under 
a legal obligation to prospect, but before he does anything of value 
he gives an option to a Syndicate for say £500 cash and £1000 in 
shares of any company that may later be formed. The Syndicate 
does no prospecting but a small company is formed to purchase 
the option from the Syndicate for a total consideration of say 
£3000. This company may spend a few hundred pounds on 
preliminary prospecting, and if there is the slightest vestige of 
gold, it offers the option to substantial Australian or British 
interests for, say, £10,000. To prospect the property properly may 
be a matter of £5,000. The overseas interests would be prepared 
to expend £5,000 in prospecting, but the demands of the option 
holders are so excessive that the negotiations fail. In reality the 
property is worth nothing until its mining potentialities have 
been proved. 
 
Prospecting was often inadequate, and bores and drives were 
sometimes salted ‘by vendors, promoters or other interested parties’.  
 
Concentrates may be assayed and then the values circulated as 
being representative of the material in the mine in its normal 
state, or samples may be taken from a mine and honestly 
assayed, but the samples in themselves may not be anything like 
representative of the average class of material to be mined. 
 
Other defects were manipulation of the share market and ‘forward 
selling of shares’ by directors, along with dividing the capital into shares of 
low value. He gave seven examples of misleading statements in 
prospectuses: 
 
11 
(a) A quotation of ancient history and of geological and other 
statements made half a century ago. 
(b) The non-disclosure of the results of previous prospecting that 
may have been carried out. 
(c) The non-publication of conservative engineers’ reports. 
(d) The use of extracts from Government reports separated from 
the context. 
(e) Exaggerated statements concerning associations of 
Government officers with prospecting or other operations. 
(f) Inclusion in prospectuses of reports by unqualified and 
irresponsible persons. 
(g) Grossly exaggerated estimates of production and profits.27 
 
As the papers on company flotation in the 1930s and on Malcolm 
Hardy indicate, all these points were features of prospectuses produced for 
companies at Te Aroha during that decade. An English mining journalist, 
James Herbert Curle, who investigated mining throughout the world, 
blamed speculators’ greed for encouraging such practices: 
 
It may be said that three-quarters of all transactions in mining 
shares come under the head of gambling, pure and simple. The 
average gambler in mines cares nothing for the intrinsic value of 
a property; he does not study its past history, he does not intend 
to hold the shares for dividends – in fact, he wants to know 
nothing about the mine. All he asks for is a large profit on his 
speculation in a minimum period.28 
 
A prominent New Zealand miner agreed it was ‘of no moment to the 
ordinary promoter what the prospects of the property may really be – he is a 
promoter, not a holder for dividend’, and did not ‘intend to be a shareholder 
longer than he can help’.29 
New Zealand newspapers on several occasions exposed fraudulent 
discoveries and company flotations, notably Brogan’s rush at Whangamata 
                                            
27 Under-Secretary, Mines Department, to J.S. Barton (Chairman, Bondholders 
Incorporation Commission), 23 May 1935, Mines Department, MD 1, 12/1/11, ANZ-W. 
28 J.H. Curle, The Gold Mines of the World, 2 ed. (London, 1902), p. 337. 
29 James Williams, second essay in Three Prize Essays on the Present Condition and Future 
Prospects of the Mineral Resources of New Zealand and the Best Means of Fostering their 
Development (Wellington, 1907), p. 180. 
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in 1873,30 several Waitekauri claims,31 and five companies: Union Beach,32 
Haven,33 Paraquot,34 Pinafore,35 and Portsea. 36 They constantly warned 
investors to be cautious and avoid the ‘madness’ of ‘the yellow fever’, as the 
Thames Advertiser described scrip gambling.37 In 1882 the Thames Star 
related the tale of the razor seller of Newcastle: 
 
He sold his razors at one shilling a dozen, and Hodge purchased 
one. After scraping vigorously, but ineffectually, at his face for 
some time, and cutting himself severely, in great wrath he 
hunted up the razor-merchant. Upon finding him he exclaimed, 
“This razor won’t shave.” “I did not expect it would,” was the cool 
reply. “What was it made for then?” interrogated the 
dumbfounded bumpkin. “Made for? Why, made to sell.”38 
 
The following year, the Thames Advertiser applauded indications that 
investors were dealing with shares ‘upon safer business principles’ than 
previously, calculating ‘the exact yields’ which could be predicted, the likely 
dividend, and appropriate shares prices. It hoped that this would continue 
and  
 
kill the boulder-floating gentry, who, upon the strength of a bit of 
gold got in a mine which is being honestly worked, peg out all the 
unoccupied ground round about, float companies to take it up, 
and then clear out as quickly as possible at whatever price they 
can obtain for their interests as “promoters,” without having paid 
a single farthing into the ventures.39 
                                            
30 Auckland Weekly News, 1 February 1873, pp. 6, 9, 22 February 1873, p. 15, 1 March 
1873, p. 5, 8 March 1873, p. 6, 7 April 1888, p. 29; Ohinemuri Correspondent, Thames 
Advertiser, 14 December 1885, p. 3. 
31 Thames Advertiser, 19 August 1876, p. 3, 4 September 1876, p. 3, 12 September 1876, p. 
3. 
32 Editorial, Auckland Weekly News, 24 March 1877, p. 12. 
33 Editorial, Thames Star, 7 April 1881, p. 2; Auckland Weekly News, 9 April 1881, p. 7, 16 
April 1881, p. 15, 18 March 1882, p. 11, 25 March 1882, p. 23. 
34 Thames Advertiser, 18 May 1887, p. 2. 
35 Thames Star, 26 July 1890, p. 2. 
36 Observer, 4 August 1894, p. 7. 
37 Editorial, Thames Advertiser, 18 November 1882, p. 2. 
38 Editorial, Thames Star, 6 September 1882, p. 2. 
39 Thames Advertiser, 21 July 1883, p. 2. 
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The public was urged to show ‘greater discrimination’ and to make 
‘exhaustive inquiries in every possible disinterested quarter before 
investing in any new venture, and to stipulate that the capital subscribed 
should be legitimately expended in the development of the ground’.40   
 
COMPANY LAW 
 
In discussing early goldmining companies in Victoria, Australia, 
Geoffrey Blainey noted that ‘gambling in shares was not surprising in a 
goldmining colony. Early diggers had gambled on finding gold with every 
swing of their pick’, and those with other occupations ‘merely changed their 
gambling venue from a shaft lit by candles to a broker’s office lit by gas’.41 A 
problem for legislators seeking to protect investors was ‘to limit the liability 
of each shareholder for the company’s debts should the mine fail’, but early 
legislation failed to cope with the transfer of most shares to dummies, 
‘mysterious nobodies who were not worth suing or could not be found to be 
sued’. This left the ‘honest shareholders’ being sued for a percentage of debt 
vastly disproportionate to his interest.42 To resolve this problem, in 1871 
Victoria passed its No Liability Act, considered by Blainey to be ‘one of the 
most radical experiments in company law in the English-speaking world’.43 
Now a speculator could only lose the amount invested, and ‘once he decided 
the mine had no prospect of success he could forfeit his shares’. These new 
companies encouraged poor men to invest by selling shares on time 
payment, requiring a deposit and monthly instalments. The rest of 
Australia quickly adopted this law, which encouraged investment but also 
‘encouraged mining companies to start with inadequate funds and so 
increased their risk of failure’.44 It also, according to the Auckland press, 
encouraged reckless speculation and lowered ‘commercial morality’.45 In 
1898 a Paeroa newspaper attacked the ‘crude absurdities’ of the Mining 
                                            
40 Editorial, Thames Star, 23 February 1891, p. 2. 
41 Geoffrey Blainey, The Rush that Never Ended: A history of Australian Mining, rev. ed. 
(Melbourne, 1964), p. 98. 
42 Blainey, Rush that Never Ended, p. 98. 
43 Blainey, Rush that Never Ended, p. 99. 
44 Blainey, Rush that Never Ended, p. 99. 
45 Auckland Weekly News, 27 April 1867, p. 23. 
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Companies Act that ‘bred masses of the bacilli now eating the industry to 
the core’.46 
Brian Hill, in examining the career of David Ziman in South Island 
mining from the late nineteenth century onwards, noted that when, under 
the no liability system, shareholders failed to pay calls, their forfeited 
shares were auctioned. Proceeds up to the amount of the unpaid call went to 
the company, with any balance after paying expenses going to the forfeiting 
shareholder. A reserve price of the amount of the call was usually set, but if 
the shares were not sold, the company could later sell them at any price, the 
company obtaining all the proceeds.47 New Zealand preferred limited 
liability companies, not only because they meant mining continued but 
because they provided protection of creditors’ interests, as a receiver could 
require shareholders to pay the unpaid portion of their shares.48 Hill argued 
that raising capital through partly paid shares in limited liability 
companies  
 
exacerbated market crashes in difficult times, as investors 
dumped their shares in panic to avoid the likelihood of calls, for 
which they were liable. It also made wealthy individuals 
unwilling to invest in gold mining shares. The policy of issuing 
contributing shares in limited liability companies with capital 
called up in instalments had been designed to make mining 
investment attractive with a form of time payment for shares. 
 
He considered that this policy made it ‘difficult for legitimate ventures 
to raise substantial capital’.49 
By the late nineteenth century, preferences had changed. Whereas all 
the companies floated at Te Aroha and Waiorongomai from 1880 to 1883 
were, like elsewhere, limited liability companies, during the boom of the 
1890s almost all were no liability ones. In the second half of 1895, for 
instance, only three of the companies floated were limited liability ones.50 
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The no liability companies floated in that year were praised because, 
‘whereas in the past any holders of scrip were liable for the full amount of 
their shares’, under this system people could ‘hold as much scrip as they can 
pay for, without any further liability, unless they choose to increase the 
amount of their holding’.51 A member of the Auckland Chamber of Mines, 
who had once been a pioneer of Coromandel and Thames mining, when in 
England in 1896 explained the virtues of these companies: 
 
The main object in starting these “no liability” companies was to 
induce small capitalists to invest with the knowledge that they 
would not be ruined by calls. You can pay 2s or 3s on a 5s share, 
and if it is found that more money is needed to develop the mine, 
you can resign your shares to the company and be quit of all 
responsibility. The men who are earning from 7s to 8s a day are 
amongst our greatest mining investors, and they know that under 
the “no liability” they cannot be sold out of house and home.52 
 
One defect, as explained by the Chamber of Mines in the following 
year, was that shares forfeited for non-payment of calls had to be auctioned 
for whatever they would fetch. 
 
In times of temporary depression, large holders of shares 
frequently fail to pay their calls, and when their shares are sold 
by auction they buy them for a nominal price, sometimes less 
than one-fourth of the amount of the call. The market having 
been cleared of shares, their value advances, and so shares which 
have been bought at auction by the defaulters themselves … have 
within a week of two been sold at three or four times the amount 
of such call. It is thought that this is unfair to the shareholders 
who pay their calls punctually.53 
 
An Englishman who inspected Western Australian and New Zealand 
mines during 1897 was appalled: 
 
If you do not pay, no one can make you. The shares may be put up 
to auction and sold; but if you don’t want the shares, that will not 
worry you very much. When a call is made, and you think it will 
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pay you to forfeit your shares, you do so, and buy them back again 
at the auction free of any call whatever. This sounds farcical and 
impossible except in a Gilbert and Sullivan opera, but it is done 
continually in Auckland.54 
 
DUMMIES 
 
New Zealanders were aware that suing for calls created ‘dummyism’. 
For instance, in 1869 the views of a Ballarat correspondent were reprinted 
in Auckland. He explained that suing under the forfeiture system led to 
favouritism, delay, and expense, with honest investors likely to be saddled 
with paying calls until the company was profitable, whereupon ‘loafers’ 
claimed their share. Should the company fail, those who had not paid 
mocked the honest. 
 
This led to the general introduction of dummyism…. When 
shareholders of substance found that, under the system of 
recovering calls at law, they had all the burden to bear, they were 
compelled, for their own protection, to register their interests in 
fictitious names, and this innovation has been generally adopted. 
The advantage to companies is that they have the power, without 
being compelled to incur heavy legal expenses, of transferring 
shares from those who will not contribute to the expenses of a 
company to those who may do so.55 
 
Two years later, one disadvantage of using dummies was reported: 
 
It was a common practice in Auckland to transfer scrip in 
companies to “dummies” to avoid calls, with an understanding 
that the property should be transferred if it ever should be of 
value enough to make that operation worth while. As this was 
generally done by large holders, and the wealthiest men in the 
company, the effect was frequently to burst up the companies, 
which had to be wound up with great loss to the creditors. A good 
many companies, however, managed to keep alive, and in some of 
those now scrip is of considerable value, in consequence of better 
prospects. In the instance we have been informed of, the 
gentleman went the other day to his “dummy,” and requested 
that the scrip be re-transferred, as now, instead of carrying with 
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it a heavy liability, it was worth several hundred pounds. To his 
astonishment and disgust, however, the “dummy” refused, saying 
that he had taken the risk and responsibility, and would now 
take the profit.56 
 
An example of one such dummy was mentioned in 1882 by Frederick 
Whitaker, who was a speculator as well as a Premier of the colony. ‘At 
Auckland a street-sweeper once held more shares than all the rest of the 
community, as he was the recognised dummy for the town. Some of the 
shares transferred to him happened to turn out well, and then the 
fraudulent transferrors wanted them back, but [William] Lestrange57 was 
too sensible for them’.58 These ‘dummy transfers’ made it harder for 
companies to collect calls.59 This may have been why ‘Daldy’ McWilliams, 
one of the first to mine at Te Aroha,60 ‘went under the name of Gerald Field’ 
in the statutory declaration of shareholdings in the Puru Consolidated 
Company.61 Even John McCombie, an outspoken critic of goldfield fraud, 
told the warden in 1922 that he was ‘a shareholder in the Crown Co. but the 
shares do not appear in my name’.62  
As an example of how company secretaries (known as legal managers 
in the nineteenth century) held shares in trust for shareholders who did not 
wish their identities known, 375 shares in the Lady Ferguson Company, 
floated at Waiorongomai in 1883, were held by the legal manager ‘in trust 
for sundry shareholders’. The company also held 7,500 shares in its own 
name,63 for later sale to raise more capital. 
In 1885, sharebrokers held thousands of clients’ shares in their own 
names, giving the ‘power of manipulating so many shares in the hands of 
the brokers’. Purchasers didn’t register shares in their names partly to 
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avoid high fees and because they planned to sell them quickly.64 Later that 
year amendments made to the Mining Companies Act prevented 
shareholders evading calls by selling their shares after a call was made, a 
form of dummying ended by requiring shares to be officially transferred.65 
However, ten years later Samuel Cochrane Macky,66 a mining agent 
actively involved in early Waiorongomai mining,67 explained that ‘scores of 
men and women in Auckland’ who invested in mining did ‘not wish to be 
troubled signing transfers’ and ‘invariably’ asked ‘their broker to put the 
shares in his own name’. When he floated companies, Macky had ‘frequently 
been asked by the purchasers to put the shares in my own name in trust, 
and when I have refused they would give me a broker’s name, the reason 
being that they did not wish to have their names published in the New 
Zealand Gazette and a local newspaper as required by the Act’. As for 
legislative attempts to prevent brokers trading in shares, this would always 
happen, for ‘if not in his own name he can arrange with a friend’.68 A clause 
to this effect was passed after Goldfields Committee received complaints 
from throughout the country that investors’ confidence was ‘being destroyed 
by the action of many brokers being jobbers, not confining themselves to 
selling and buying shares on commission. It is notorious that brokers 
frequently both sell and buy shares for themselves before they do for their 
customers’.69 The Thames Advertiser applauded the new rule, citing a recent 
example where some sharebrokers, ‘taking advantage of the number of 
shares in their names, many of them held in trust, were combining to 
render void’ an agreement made by the directors of two mines. 
Parliamentarians had decided that, to stop brokers holding shares and 
potentially influencing their value, they were to be prohibited from holding 
shares in their names or trading in shares for themselves, their family, or 
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their clerks.70 Consequently, a broker could not hold others’ shares in his 
name; but others could hold shares for him in their names. 
Another mining agent said that ‘nine out of every ten transfers on the 
Stock Exchange had the names omitted’, blank transfers being signed ‘as 
they were in such a hurry to get it’.71 All of which made it difficult for the 
law, and the historian, to be precise about who held how many shares. By 
the twentieth century, the law had been tightened, as the Observer noted: 
‘There was a time when shareholders dummied their shares with impunity, 
and resorted to other dodges to avoid payment of calls, but the law is 
already severe enough to prevent abuses of this kind’.72 
 
DISHONEST CLAIMS OF HAVING GOOD ORE 
 
Unceasing reports of questionable if not immoral behaviour by those 
investing in mining almost made it seem as though capital was never raised 
legitimately and no trustworthy people were involved. Disreputable rather 
than reputable transactions always attracted most attention, either with 
direct condemnation or implied criticism. According to the Observer, it was 
not only mining that had a bad reputation: in 1892, for instance, it claimed 
that ‘Auckland continues to maintain her reputation for commercial 
dishonesty’.73 Allegedly more than in other industries, mining attracted 
fraudulent speculators, from prospectors to company promoters, on every 
field throughout the world.74 As the Observer noted, it was ‘astonishing how 
readily prospectors find rich gold, when things are stirring on the Exchange, 
in ground that no one would put a pick in when things are dull’.75 A miner 
from California, writing about early Thames, criticized men he claimed 
were willing ‘to float anything from a boulder to a bald bluff, quartz or no 
quartz’. Working men were needed, not floaters.76 He warned against those 
who would 
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float claims that are unprospected, unproved, and resorting to 
such devices as locating the ground on the map - yards from 
where it really lies - running reefs through the ground on paper, 
which in fact does not touch it; and even in some cases placing 
before the public property with no title; sending the scrip to 
distant towns, and by bulling and bearing the markets, work it off 
at high rates, quietly step out, leaving their victims to bear the 
burden or sink beneath the load.77 
 
Mining laws tried to limit the risks to investors, but could not prevent 
attempts to attract capital to dubious ventures by deliberately fraudulent 
methods, which was a universal phenomenon. For instance, Blainey cites 
the example of a Western Australian mine where the samples that induced 
promoters to float a company were either salted or assayed ‘with intent to 
deceive’. An investigation discovered ‘corrupt employees deceiving a corrupt 
chairman who had long been deceiving the shareholders’.78 An English 
mining reporter who visited Thames in 1897 gave examples proving the 
worthlessness of local reports about prospects: 
 
A gentleman came to see me one day and asked me if I would like 
to see a really big reef – 200 feet wide. I imagined I had found a 
new Alaska Treadwell or Homestake, and embraced my friend’s 
offer. Whereupon he produced detailed reports by local experts, 
which each and all confirmed one another in the minutest detail. 
We took horses and experts and started up a creek…. 
At last we reached the famous big reef, which, by the way, was 
being mined by an Auckland company with a capital of £200,000. 
I think four men were at work, and the manager met us on a 
convenient rock and pointed out a wall of quartz some sixty feet 
high. “You see,” said he, “the river divides the reef.” Personally I 
had never heard of a river strong enough to cut a quartz reef 
longitudinally, but I kept my mouth shut and produced my tape 
measure, and my tame expert set to work upon the reef with a 
hammer and sample bags. We spent the day climbing cliffs, 
panning dirt and prospecting the hundred acres through which 
the 200 feet reef was supposed to run, carrying its ounces of gold. 
In the end we proved very conclusively that the reef was only 18 
feet wide, and our assays gave us values ranging from 8s to 25s – 
utterly unpayable, of course. This is a sample of local mining 
reports. They were absolutely untrue. They were handed [to] me 
by a company with a large capital, and the directors wanted to 
sell for some enormous sum – so huge that I have forgotten the 
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amount. No work had ever been done to prove the value of the 
reef or its size. The directors stated that the reef was 200 feet 
wide, and was worth many pounds per ton. But they had never 
made any genuine attempt to test the truth of their experts’ 
reports. 
We mounted our horses and scrambled home as quickly as 
possible. We had seen some beautiful gorges, but no mines. 
A big, burly fellow came into the hotel one morning and said he 
wanted to show me “the finest mine in the peninsula.” Those were 
his exact words. We rode over hill and valley some half-dozen 
perilous miles, and came to a tunnel, with the usual watercourse 
careering down it. We waded a few hundred yards in and reached 
the face – good hard andersitic rock. 
“But where is the reef?” I asked. “We shall strike the reef in 
ninety feet,” replied the vendor. And this was “the finest mine in 
the peninsula.” Of course, the existence of the reef was mere 
surmise; but as every hill had dozens of quartz reefs running 
through it, I have no doubt my would-be vendor would strike 
something if he only kept on long enough. He had the usual 
hundred acres.79 
 
These examples could be interpreted as being exaggerated claims 
rather than deliberate frauds, but exaggeration and fraud tainted all mines 
by association. That so many companies failed supported suspicions that 
mines were ‘boomed’ on little real basis. At Waiorongomai, there were 
exaggerated, and probably knowingly exaggerated, claims for worthless 
ones. For instance, Charles Manuel,80 an experienced Thames miner, later 
became a leading figure in the Seddon and Bendigo companies at 
Waiorongomai.81 When these sought capital, he made unrealistic 
statements about the field, in 1908 telling his fellow county councillors that 
he had no doubt that ‘before long’ it would ‘prove to be one of the best gold-
producing districts of the Dominion’.82 The following year, the local 
newspaper commented that he ‘spoke very encouragingly the other evening 
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on the prospects’.83 It was more than encouragingly: it was absurdly over-
stated, as a man of practical experience must have known, and it was 
blatantly linked to his desire to raise capital for these companies.84 His 
statements at a social had been made in reply to a toast to the mining 
industry: 
 
He had been following up mining for 40 years, and he would say 
deliberately that Waiorongomai was the richest place he had ever 
seen in New Zealand. The reefs were large and numerous, and all 
carried gold. When the necessary capital and skill had been 
obtained, and the necessary machinery erected, the mines would 
become dividend-paying at once. His knowledge had been gained 
in the school of experience, and his opinion was that 
Waiorongomai would some day outshine Waihi. The Bendigo reef 
was far richer than the Martha was when he first saw it. What 
had made Waihi was the right kind of men, and money. The 
Silver King reef was doubly as rich as the Martha, the ore was 
sulphide, and the deeper it went the better it became.85 
 
Even when claims were not exaggerated, share prices varied all the 
time depending on the quality of the ore extracted. For example, when a 
South Island journalist inspected Waiorongomai in October 1883, before the 
first crushing deflated expectations, he noted both the reported quality of 
the ore and the value of the shares. In the Premier, the reef showed ‘gold in 
abundance’, and the miners were ‘very sanguine as to the results of the 
forthcoming crushing. The large quantity of quartz to hand has a very rich 
appearance, and should show a very favourable result’, meaning that its £1 
shares were ‘worth in the open market at present 15s’. The nearby Colonist 
had ‘fine gold throughout the stone’, which ‘grows richer as they drive into 
the reef’, but as the yield was anticipated to be less than the Premier and 
shares were ‘now worth 8s to 8s 6d’. The Werahiko had ‘a very promising 
reef, from 2 to 12ft in thickness, showing good gold in a run of 42ft’, making 
its shares worth from 6s to 6s 6d. The New Find, ‘one of the favourite 
Companies’, has struck good gold, making its shares worth ‘about 8s 6d’. As 
the Vermont had ‘just struck rich stone in a reef 4ft thick’, its shares had 
‘taken a great rise in value’, unspecified. In contrast, in the Arizona, where 
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‘the richest piece of stone found on the surface’ had been discovered’, its 
shares were ‘very low in price’ because its deep level was yet to cut the 
reef.86 
 
FRAUDULENT ASSAYS 
 
Welton noted that the price paid to vendors was usually based on 
assays of ore samples. Because of the ‘difficulties’ involved in determining 
values, with results often varying ‘considerably from the expectations 
looked for’, it was prudent for assays to be subjected ‘to the criticism of 
independent engineers of considerable experience’. It was common for 
assays to be given ‘a much higher value than the actual yield when the ore 
has been broken and milled. This might arise from the ore from the centre 
of a block of ground marked out having diminished in value’, and most reefs 
decreased in yield at depth. Especially, it had ‘generally been admitted that 
much depends upon the personal factor of the investigator, his experience, 
temperament, and his desire to arrive at the most impartial results’.87 
Assays, especially those giving high values, ‘should be received with great 
caution’. When large purchase prices were sought purchasers could 
‘reasonably require’ that estimates of values should be based not just on 
assays of samples ‘but upon the results of milling some hundreds of tons or 
ore’. Anyone not requiring this ran ‘great risks, and should not complain’ of 
losing money ‘or lay the blame to gold-mining if such should happen’.88  
The only proven case of a man working at Waiorongomai offering to 
arrange a deliberate fraud was a blatant letter from William Adams, Jr., an 
American who temporarily managed the Te Aroha Silver and Gold Mining 
Company’s mines and battery in 1889.89 In November that year, during a 
brief excitement over a silver discovery at Puhipuhi,  Charles Easterbrook 
Smith, a contractor at nearby Whangarei,90 sent three tons of ore to the 
Waiorongomai battery for testing.91 When the yield from the first ton tested 
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was reported to be 764 ounces of silver, ‘hardly anything else’ was ‘talked of’ 
at Whangarei.92 This report prompted Adams to write to Smith: ‘I notice in 
the Auckland Herald that this news about 764oz has been confirmed and I 
realized that you are trying to work up a boom on Puhipuhi but am afraid it 
will not stand fire unless you make a fresh start’. He recommended 
breaking out some tons, after which he would visit to take samples. 
 
I flatter myself that I know as much or more about this particular 
class of ore as any one in New Zealand and from the late tests I 
feel sanguine I could select out a ton or so that would surprise the 
natives in its returns, then bring it up here and treat it make a 
(Bang-up) boomer of a report have it published in all the leading 
Newspapers and organize a company on a big scale, let me in for 
a small share and we can realize it to our mutual satisfaction. 
Think the matter over and let me know at once what you think of 
the scheme.93 
 
Smith responded by sending this letter to the Inspecting Engineer of 
the Mines Department, who took no action apart from noting that ‘very 
little dependence’ could be placed on any past or future tests made by 
Adams.94 Smith did not take up this offer, and newspapers quickly 
discovered that a mistake had been made in deciphering the cypher 
message: the correct return was 274oz silver and 15dwt gold, still ‘a 
magnificent return’.95 When it was subsequently reported that the real 
return from the treatment at Waiorongomai was 26oz, the Minister of 
Lands was cited as considering ‘it probable that this return is more correct 
than any other’.96 Under Adams’ successor, a parcel produced a much lower 
return.97 (Adams soon left Waiorongomai to manage the Broken Hill 
Junction mine, but resigned after working there for 14 months ‘owing to a 
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disagreement with the directors’;98 perhaps he had continued to be involved 
in fraud.) 
As Blainey pointed out, the ‘essence of sound mining is to develop the 
ore body and establish reserves of ore’, for otherwise the mine would be 
quickly exhausted by removing all the high-grade ore; ore reserves were ‘as 
essential to a mine as a haystack to a farm’.99 Selecting samples for 
assaying was an easy way to commit fraud. As Herbert Hoover, a leading 
mining engineer, explained, sufficient samples should be taken to obtain 
the general value. To obtain average values required reducing ‘erratic high 
assays to the general tenor of other adjacent samples’. As samples ‘usually 
indicated higher than true values even where erratic assays had been 
eliminated’ and ‘sampling in situ generally gave a higher average value 
than the actual reduction of the ore at the mill’,100 mine managers should 
err on the side of caution. Venders and speculators, needless to say, did not 
so err. Describing how fraudulent companies were floated, Curle said the 
appointment of an ‘ignorant or dishonest manager’ was the first step. ‘If he 
searches carefully, he can nearly always discover some small bits of stone 
containing visible gold. Some of these are assayed, and the results, which, of 
course, are high, telegraphed to London: the remainder are shipped home to 
be exhibited to admiring shareholders’.101  
 
In the publishing of assays there is much dishonesty, which I am 
afraid we cannot alter, and also a good deal of irregularity which 
can be altered. To make the publication of an assay of any real 
import not only the value must be stated, but also the width of 
reef to which it pertains. The secretary of a certain mine 
publishes the statement that a cable has been received 
announcing that a reef has been struck assaying 24 dwt. Over a 
good width this would be a highly payable result; but if only two 
or three inches thick it would be unpayable. The withholding of 
the context of the information, i.e., the width of the reef, would 
allow unscrupulous directors to gain an unfair advantage in the 
share market. 
A director, or official of a new mine, will often make the 
statement (either at a meeting or in print): “Our assays go up as 
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high as 4, 8, 15 or even 20 ozs a ton;” but will carefully omit the 
fact that they go as low as 4, 8, 15 or even 20 grains a ton, and 
that so frequently as to bring the whole average down to an 
unpayable one. 
 
As using ounces, pennyweights, and grains was misleading because of 
the varied value of the bullion, ‘assay values should always be given in 
sterling or in dollars’ and the width should ‘invariably accompany the 
value’.102  
 
SALTING 
 
Mark Twain, who mined for silver in Nevada in 1862, observed the 
salting of wild cat mines. The ‘schemer’ located a worthless lode, sunk a 
shaft, dumped a portion of rich ore he had bought into it,  
 
and piled the rest by its side, above ground. Then he showed the 
property to a simpleton and sold it to him at a high figure. Of 
course the wagon-load of rich ore was all that the victim ever got 
out of his purchase. A most remarkable case of “salting” was that 
of the “North Ophir.” It was claimed that this vein was a remote 
“extension” of the original “Ophir,” a valuable mine on the 
“Comstock.” For a few days everybody was talking about the rich 
developments in the North Ophir. It was said that it yielded 
perfectly pure silver in small, solid lumps. I went to the place 
with the owners, and found a shaft six or eight feet deep, in the 
bottom of which was a badly shattered vein of dull, yellowish, 
unpromising rock. One would as soon expect to find silver in a 
grindstone. We got out a pan of the rubbish and washed it in a 
puddle, and sure enough, among the sediment we found half a 
dozen black, bullet-looking pellets of unimpeachable “native 
silver.” Nobody had ever heard of such a thing before; science 
could not account for such a queer novelty…. And then it 
transpired that the mine had been “salted” – and not in any 
hackneyed way, either, but in a singularly bold, barefaced and 
peculiarly original and outrageous fashion. On one of the lumps of 
“native” silver was discovered the minted legend, “TED STATES 
OF,” and then it was plainly apparent that the mine had been 
“salted” with melted half dollars! The lumps thus obtained had 
been blackened till they resembled native silver, and were then 
mixed with the shattered rock in the bottom of the shaft. It is 
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literally true. Of course the price of the stock at once fell to 
nothing.103 
 
The methods used to salt mines in America included shotguns.104 In 
early Thames also, guns were used to blast loose gold into soft rock, and 
gold sovereigns and silver coins were placed in quartz being crushed, but by 
the late 1870s these ‘clumsy devises’ had reportedly ‘long since been 
abandoned’.105 However, filed sovereigns salted the ‘Waitoa find’ near Te 
Aroha in the mid-1880s.106 
In California, those caught salting a claim had their ears cut off.107 
There were no reports of this happening in New Zealand, but salting was 
always viewed as a heinous offence. In 1872, for instance, miners raised £30 
as a reward for revealing who had salted the trial crushings of one Thames 
company.108 Claiming to know the truth could be a useful method of making 
money, as an Ohinemuri correspondent reported in 1888: 
 
It is stated that the sale of the Woodstock and Kenilworth mines 
at Karangahake has been spoiled by some damaging statements 
which were made about the properties, and which, if not 
altogether untrue, were made up simply of portions of the truth 
about the matter, do more harm that downright lies. More bona 
fide property than these two mines does not exist upon the 
Peninsula, and for persons to wantonly and maliciously damage 
the name of a mine for ulterior motives is nothing less than 
criminal. It is said in a quiet way a good deal of attempted 
blackmailing is often done in mining matters. I have heard of 
cases where men, who have been refused work, and for other 
causes, have actually written to gentlemen at Home [England] 
and in Australia, deliberately attempting to damage the name of 
the mines.109 
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People associated with mining in New Zealand were well aware of 
salting and inadequate sampling and assaying. For instance, the Professor 
of Chemistry at Auckland University College, Frederick Douglas Brown, 
warned in 1887 that small samples were ‘not altogether reliable, as a small 
crystal of gold may completely turn the scale, and give a very high result 
from an otherwise poor ore’.110 James Park of the Otago School of Mines 
warned of the methods used to fool those testing the ore: 
 
A common method is to tamper with the examiner’s samples; and 
for this reason the samples should always be in safe custody until 
the assay results are known. 
Cases are known where the sample-bags have been enriched 
before the samples were put into them.111 It is therefore a wise 
precaution to keep the sample-bags in a lock-up sack until they 
are required. And even then it is advisable to turn each bag inside 
out and shake vigorously before use. 
In the case of gold-mines, soft ore has been artificially enriched to 
a depth of a foot or more with a strong solution of chloride of gold. 
Fraud has been practiced on mine-examiners by stretches of rich 
ore having been skilfully built into the wall of a level at different 
intervals and at the working face, the joints being obscured by 
liberal splashes of mud. In the same way artificial outcrops have 
been prepared. 
Dumps of ore have been stacked with rich ore on the sides and top 
surface. An imposture of this kind is at once disclosed by the 
process of trenching when procuring samples for assay. 
Samples of gold-wash intended for examination by panning have 
been enriched, either before or during the washing, by the agency 
of gold-bearing tobacco-ash, pellets of clay, and gold-bearing 
finger-nails. The gold obtained from the panning of gold-wash or 
tailings should be examined under the microscope. 
Bulk samples of ore have been salted during the process of 
treatment in the battery, either by the addition of gold or 
amalgam. 
The examiner’s samples may be unlawfully enriched at any stage 
from the breaking of the material in the mine to the assaying in 
the laboratory. Strong solutions of gold chloride have been 
injected into the bags with a syringe, and gold-dust added to the 
litharge and fluxes.112 
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In 1898, the Observer asked who was ‘the old Thames miner who 
sometimes tells of the way in which he bamboozled the old-time experts, by 
spitting gold-dust into the testing pan?’113 It noted as ‘odd – very – that the 
£300 specimen in the Scotty Hauraki should happen to be dug up by a 
capitalist, who came all the way from London to see what was in the mine’, 
and devoted a cartoon to this remarkable event.114 When the 
Wharekiraupunga goldfield was exposed as worthless, this journal asked: 
‘But what about those assays of two years ago?’115 And in 1905 it noted that 
‘rich gold in prospectuses takes a long time to come to the surface’.116  
Sometimes samples came from a different mine than that being tested.  
In a case against the promoters of a company at Puru, Samuel 
Montgomery,117 who had been associated briefly with Te Aroha mining,118 
claimed that ‘some of the stone exhibited in floating the property did not 
come from the source to which it was credited’.119 When the promoters 
denied this, a newspaper commented that Montgomery had ‘an excellent 
reputation, so that one can scarcely believe that he would make a false 
statement upon oath’.120 In 1888, James Alexander Pond,121 an Auckland 
analyst who was a ‘well known and highly respected’ man, exposed Sydney 
promoters falsifying his assays for a Maratoto mine; the gold had come from 
another mine.122 Nearly two years later, William Shakespeare,123 also 
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briefly involved in the Te Aroha rush,124 discovered gold at Makara, near 
Wellington, but a Thames mine manager, John Watson Walker,125 soon 
proved it had come from another district.126 
The Observer, which regularly published hints of apparent or real 
fraud, relayed this story in 1901: 
 
This is a positive fact, and shows how mining syndicates are 
occasionally worked up. A lump of quartz, bristling with gold, had 
been discovered in a certain colony – never mind the name – by 
an enterprising booster, who sent it on to London, where it was 
greatly admired. A wealthy syndicate was immediately formed, 
and in due time there was sent out to the boomster some money 
to “work the reef.” A long period elapsed without the syndicate 
hearing anything about their El Dorado, so the members cabled 
out enquiring how the reef was turning out, to which they 
received this reply: “You have it all.”127 
  
SHEPHERDING 
 
Another trick played by the cunning was, as a mining journal 
complained,  
 
to peg out land anywhere within coo-ee of a paying mine (say the 
Hauraki), and call their property the Hauraki Extended or Block 
56, or tack some name or number on to the original name, and 
then ask for protection, and sit quietly down to wait until the 
original returns a payable yield. On the strength of this they 
immediately attempt to float an undeveloped or what may prove 
a worthless property into a company, and clear out winners 
without having invested a cent further than the paltry 
preliminary expenses. In the first place, the similarity of names is 
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confusing to the investor, who is often taken in; and in the second, 
these flotations invariably react on the market.128 
 
Over the years there were many complaints about shepherding by 
large companies.129 For instance, in 1882 the Thames Advertiser reported 
that some new Thames companies were doing no work. It warned that the 
goldfield would be permanently damaged if ‘the reckless gambling spirit’ 
was encouraged by trading in shares in companies ‘supposed to be valuable 
from their proximity to good paying mines’ while these companies did ‘not a 
particle of real development’. In the past, fraudulent promoters who hastily 
sold their interests ‘rendered Thames mining speculations a bye-word and a 
reproach throughout the colony’.130  
Charles Manuel complained in 1899 that law changes made in the past 
two years enabling large companies to hold sizeable but largely unmanned 
areas ‘were only framed to suit the capitalist’, not the working miner or 
local businessmen.131 Contradicting such arguments, McCombie wrote in 
1902 that he had ‘heard and read innumerable comments on the immense 
areas that were said to be held unworked by gold mining companies’, with 
the Waitekauri Company being a particularly ‘glaring’ example. ‘Well, some 
time since this company threw off several hundreds of acres and up to the 
present not an inch of this abandoned ground has been repegged, 
prospected, or occupied, in any way whatever’. Even if all the leases on the 
peninsula were thrown open, he doubted that they would be ‘taken up and 
worked legitimately by unaided miners’. Was it  
 
reasonable to suppose, in the face of the difficulties with which 
they would have to contend, that they could man the ground, or 
that one tenth of the men now employed by companies could 
operate the mines on their own account, and obtain reasonable 
wages? Again I unhesitatingly answer in the negative.132 
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EXPENSIVE MANAGEMENT 
 
Sometimes shareholders gained the impression that their money was 
used simply to pay the salaries of those running the company. When asked 
by a shareholder in a Thames mine why, over three years, it had produced 
only enough to pay the wages of the legal manager and the directors, the 
Observer responded: ‘Perhaps some of those honest brokers in the Insurance 
Buildings could … give “a shareholder” a hint or two of how the oracle is 
worked’.133 In 1895, ‘A Small Investor’ considered that promoters should 
work ‘as economically as possible’ instead of being too greedy.  
 
Those interested in the bleeding operations are ready with a cut-
and-dried programme; a few professional directors, a legal 
manager, a solicitor, etc, are appointed, and at a remuneration 
out of all proportion for services likely ever to be rendered, and 
without the remotest idea whether the mine will ever help to pay 
these charges; and having the subscribed capital on hand very 
little is cared either. 
 
Some legal managers worked for over 20 companies, ‘drawing about £2 
per week from each, besides transfer fees, a truly princely income, 
considering that the whole work of the management, besides that of 
sharebroking and other business, is done by a staff of two clerks and a boy, 
at the most costing about £4 10s a week in wages’. By the time funds had 
‘filtered on to the ground’ there was ‘little available for ascertaining 
whether any precious metal exists, leaving out the question the machinery 
and labour required for the extraction’.134 An editorial agreed, for in very 
few cases were sufficient funds set aside for prospecting and unless work 
started promptly ‘that sum will soon be swallowed up in the legal manager’s 
salary and in other expenses’.135 Two years later, the Observer reported a 
new dictionary’s definition of mining: ‘A scheme for raising guineas to pay 
directors’ fees’, a definition it believed would ‘meet with general approval in 
Auckland’.136 
Shareholders often did not benefit from whatever mining was done. In 
January 1896, ‘queer accounts’ were received from several fields of how 
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funds were being ‘frittered away. In many of the mines no honest, 
legitimate work is being done, and yet the pay-sheets come in regularly to 
be settled’.137 In the following year there were reports that English 
companies intended to  
 
make great reductions in mining expenses, shutting down for a 
while or reducing men, but you hear nothing of reducing the ex’s 
of legal management. One mine in particular in the Upper 
Thames was paying all expenses for mining, trucking, crushing 
and local office expenses, but when the Home legal expenses were 
added, there was a serious loss. Home management sounds 
almost like Home robbery.138 
 
‘Observer’, concerned that management expenses were too high, 
especially in English companies, had been told that many mines were 
‘spending £2 or £3 per month in the management for every £1 spent in 
working or prospecting the mine’.139 A mining reporter cited ‘a man who 
ought to know’ saying ‘that for every £100 spent on our claims £60 goes on 
legal expenses, legal management, rent, etc, to £40 spent on working the 
ground. The mere legal management of a claim costs from £1 to 30s per 
week’.140 He knew of ‘many companies which have got through all their 
capital without doing any real work on the claim’.141 
In 1909, a Te Aroha resident recounted his fortunes in a company 
which started ‘apparently with all the essentials of complete success’ but 
finished as ‘a complete and bewildering fiasco’. It ‘started with a capital of 
£125,000 in £1 shares, of which about £75,000 or £80,000 was to be raised 
in cash to provide the necessary machinery’ to treat the ore: 
 
Out of the capital so raised it would be necessary for 150 poor 
families to contribute £10 each for two years to pay the secretary; 
£20 is about as much as a working man can put into a mining 
venture, so 150 families would be denuded of £20 each to pay one 
man for two years. The next two biggest men receive about as 
much between them. That means 300 families beggered to pay 
these men for being connected with the concern. Now we want 
larger figures, or we shall never get the money, so put 60 fairly 
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well-to-do persons, each putting in £500, makes another £30,000. 
Now, 30 well-to-do families each putting £1,000 makes another 
£30,000, being £60,000 contributed by 96 families, to get the 
other £9,000 supposed it is contributed in sums of £60 each, it 
will take 180 families to contribute this much, thus we get a total 
of 570 families impoverished by this one mining venture. In 
addition to this a numbers of tradesmen’s accounts, some running 
for a long time, are left unpaid, waiting for the machinery to start 
producing both copper, gold, and silver in accordance yielding its 
promised harvest of wealth, yet not a single shilling brought to 
hand, while the Directors and officials of the Company display all 
the indifference and callousness of Greek Brigands.142 
 
PRESS PUFFERY 
 
Getting a newspaper to praise mines was always an advantage. Curle 
had harsh words for London’s financial press: 
 
One of the worst things of all in connection with gold-mining is 
the financial press, with a very few honourable exceptions. It is 
the chiefest channel of news between the man who deceives, and 
the public which is deceived; and I have no hesitation in saying 
that generally the paper for its own profit lends itself to what is 
dishonest. These papers are regularly subsidised by people who 
find them useful. Often, all that is required is a slight twisting of 
facts; more rarely, a suppression of the truth; but if necessary a 
series of downright lies is resorted to. The payment of these 
papers is made as being payment for advertisements, at perhaps 
ten times the usual rate, but in cases the proprietor or editor will 
receive options on shares or a regular subsidy. 
I imagine there are few people realise to what an extent this 
vicious system is carried on in London. Knowing as I do the real 
value of practically every gold mine in the world, it makes me 
sick to see the way in which, day after day, year after year, facts 
are distorted, bad mines are proclaimed good, scoundrels are 
praised, and lies sown broadcast. Over all there is a delicious 
optimism. The editor … is at peace with the world, and his 
message to his dupes is one of cheer and good-will. All mining 
shares, apparently, are about to rise, and keep on rising; every 
one is on the verge of making money; and it is a delightful world 
altogether.143 
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Mark Twain described how it was ‘the friendly custom’ to go to 
newspaper offices to give an interest to the reporters before getting them to 
report on a mine: 
 
They did not care a fig what you said about the property so you 
said something. Consequently we generally said a word or two to 
the effect that the “indications” were good, or that the ledge 
[meaning lode] was “six feet wide,” or that the rock “resembled 
the Comstock” (and so it did – but as a general thing the 
resemblance was not startling enough to knock you down). If the 
rock was moderately promising, we followed the custom of the 
country, used strong adjectives and frothed at the mouth as if a 
very marvel in silver discoveries had transpired. If the mine was 
a “developed” one, and had no pay ore to show (and of course it 
hadn’t), we praised the tunnel; said it was one of the most 
infatuating tunnels in the land; driveled and driveled about the 
tunnel till we ran entirely out of ecstasies – but never said a word 
about the rock. We would squander half a column of adulation on 
a shaft, or a new wire rope, or a dressed pine windlass, or a 
fascinating force pump, and close with a burst of admiration of 
the “gentlemanly and efficient Superintendent” of the mine – but 
never utter a whisper about the rock. And those people were 
always pleased, always satisfied.144 
 
Apart from some journals with a fleeting existence, New Zealand had 
no newspapers solely devoted to mining speculation that could be subverted 
in the manner described by Curle and Twain. No New Zealand newspaper 
has been found to be as corrupt as Twain recalled, but venial reports may 
have appeared. Certainly there was relatively minor ‘booming’. For 
instance, Henry Brett, later Sir Henry,145 proprietor of the Auckland Star 
and, for a time, the Te Aroha News,146 for two years owned a mine at Tui,147 
and invested widely elsewhere. In 1899, the Observer noted, tongue-in-
cheek, that it was said that the Star’s ‘strong preliminary booming of the 
Mercury Bay auriferous find had nothing to do with the fact that Mr Brett 
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had pegged out the ground next the Welcome Jack. It was a purely 
disinterested bit of booming’.148  
Press reports were the only information available about most mines, as 
‘A Sorrowing and Repentant Auckland Shareholder’ lamented in 1891: 
 
I have paid calls plentifully; I have had no dividends, and I know 
no more of what is going on at these mines or amongst the 
managing bodies that I know of what is going on in the moon. 
Someone will say, who reads this, that the newspapers teem with 
daily information. Is it correct information? It is certainly not 
official information, and some of it I know to be false, and 
published … to run up or pull down the value of shares, as the 
case may be.  
 
He had been provoked into writing by a report about Puhipuhi from 
‘some irresponsible unknown’ who appeared to be trying to lower the value 
of its shares. As a shareholder in several companies which he believed 
owned ‘good payable mines’, he had received ‘no information as to why my 
calls were needed, or what is to be done with them. I mean official 
information, signed by somebody who will be responsible to me for the truth 
of what he says’. As newspapers did not publish adequate information, he 
wanted an Act passed 
 
compelling directors to furnish to the shareholders quarterly 
signed statements showing what they are doing in the mines, and 
making it a criminal offence to furnish such statement falsely, 
either from wilfulness or from criminal ignorance. Also, let it be 
enacted that along with every “call” on the shareholders a similar 
written signed statement shall be furnished, showing the purpose 
for which such call is required. Also, let it be enacted that every 
six months the shareholders shall be furnished with a similarly 
signed statement, showing the audited balance-sheet and the 
receipts and expenditure of the governing body in the 
management and development of the mine during the preceding 
six months, and let all these statements be signed by the 
managing directors and auditors, with similar penalties under 
the criminal law for willful or criminally ignorant misstatements. 
Then the public will have no further cause to complain. 
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As a shareholder in Australian mines he was provided with all this 
information.149 But in 1869, an Auckland newspaper defended press reports 
about Thames mines, instead blaming the informants: 
 
Day after day false reports are circulated or important 
information withheld. In a most unblushing manner the press is 
made the medium for the publication of false statements…. If 
quartz is found in a claim, it has become the fashion to declare at 
once that it is highly auriferous, and if a few specimens are taken 
out of claims, the almost invariable jargon is that they are better 
than anything before found on the field. 
 
As it was difficult for newspapers to know the truth, journalists either 
had to accept what they were told or not report anything. ‘The newspapers 
are not the authors, but the victims, of false, or perhaps it would be more 
correct to say exaggerated, intelligence’. In urging those who informed the 
press to be more accurate, it argued that ‘on the lowest ground – that of 
expediency – they may rest assured that truth is in all cases the best 
policy’.150 Another journal, in 1895, commented on an Australian protest at 
newspaper reporting: 
 
A crowd of disappointed diggers broke the windows of the 
newspaper offices in Coolgardie the other day, because a certain 
“find” turned out to contain considerably more rumour than 
reality. The papers, they declared, had for their own gain 
published unsupported news. But supposing the papers had held 
off, and supposing the news had turned out to be true, that there 
had, in fact, been a splendid gold find. The public would in this 
case have been even more virtuous and even more violently 
indignant. The papers, they would have said, kept back the news 
till their friends got a good start for the field. Much the same 
thing happened in the case of the recent fluctuations in [the] May 
Queen. Speculators who rushed the shares at thirteen shillings in 
the sure and certain hope “they would see a pound” blame 
everyone save themselves for their loss, and in the fury of 
disappointed greed do not hesitate to level charges against 
brokers, the papers, the directors, the managers – in fact, 
everyone and everything except their own folly, and insensate 
desire to make a “hatful” of money “without working for it.”151 
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No cases have been uncovered of deliberate misinformation being 
reported about any Te Aroha mines. The most that the local newspaper and 
local correspondents could be accused of was over-enthusiasm and 
interpreting each development as ‘encouraging’, the favourite description. 
Such a positive approach was to be expected when residents and supporters 
of the field were always hoping for economic success. After the boom of the 
1890s collapsed, one explanation was that the New Zealand press had 
excessively boomed mines that had not come up to expectations.152 
  
LARGER AREAS OF GROUND TO ATTRACT INVESTORS 
 
As one investor noted, ‘a large amount of capital could not be raised for 
a small area like a licensed holding’.153 In the 1890s, special claims covering 
larger areas were seen as ways to attract larger overseas investments. For 
example, John Watson Walker, who helped to float the Waihi Company in 
London,154 in 1898 told the Minister of Mines that ‘different mining 
legislation was required for the Te Aroha district, as the restrictions needful 
for other parts of the field such as the Thames, were simply oppressive 
when applied’ there.155 In the following year he sought from 400 to 500 
acres to enable him to make arrangements for large-scale development 
using ‘very large capital, applied on scientific and practical principles’, to 
handle the refractory ores to be found at ‘otherwise inaccessible altitudes’. 
He expected to raise sufficient money in England, but was told that such a 
large area was impossible under the regulations.156 Although the local 
bodies supported his proposal, and he appealed personally to the Minister, 
it was not approved.157 However, in 1901 he was granted Walker’s First, 
Second, and Third Special Quartz Claims, each of 100 acres, the first near 
the Tui district, the others in the watersheds of the Mangakino Stream and 
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Waitawheta River.158 In 1903, he was granted several special claims at 
Waihi totalling almost 700 acres.159  
While conceding that some mining areas were ‘capitalist’ ones, 
requiring spending thousands of pounds before receiving any return, and 
therefore grants of large areas were appropriate, the Thames Advertiser 
applauded Warden Northcroft’s 1891 decision to grant no licenses for areas 
exceeding 30 acres, amalgamation being permitted only after claims had 
been tested. It argued that ‘even a rich man can test a small holding more 
thoroughly than he can a large one, and if the results are poor he is likely to 
lose less, while if they are good he is likely to make more in proportion to 
his outlay than he would if his holdings were large’. Northcroft’s ruling also 
gave a chance to ‘the poor as well as the rich man’, for large holdings 
permitted the latter to monopolize mining areas.160  
 
SURVEYS 
 
An early Thames miner was critical of many surveyors, ‘some of whom 
we fear are ready to bring a reef into any direction that will suit the owner 
of a lease or claim’.161 Plans of claims sometimes showed reefs before 
adequate prospecting had been done, as at Waitekauri in 1876.162 During 
the 1890s, maps of Ohinemuri showed reefs that did not exist. A Paeroa 
correspondent who exposed this fraud (by vendors, not surveyors) wanted 
the prosecution and even flogging of those responsible for thereby ‘obtaining 
money under false pretenses’. Vendors should be required to meet the cost 
of inspecting properties before they were put on the market; it was no 
longer sufficient ‘to put four pegs in a piece of ground and give it a name’.163 
Earlier, the Chamber of Mines suggested that the mining inspector should 
compile a plan of all workings to enable investors to see ‘the amount of work 
done in and around the mine offered for sale, and the probable run of the 
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reefs from any of the adjacent mines traversing the property offered’.164 This 
suggestion was not taken up. 
 
‘EXPERTS’ 
 
Reportedly a ‘high mining expert’ defined ‘the word “expert” as follows 
– liar, blanked liar, expert’.165 The Observer commented that a mining 
reporter ‘knew what he was writing about when he said he “wished it to be 
understood that he was not a mining expert” ’, and asked whether it was 
‘not libel to call a man a “mining expert” just now?’: far worse than being 
called a liar.166 It reprinted a Melbourne Punch cartoon of a mining expert 
being refused entry to Hell because Mephistopheles wanted no rivals.167 
Two years later, it asked whether there was ‘not hope for a mining recovery 
now that the “experts” are hiving off to pastures where the honey is more 
plentiful’.168 It referred to an ‘interesting correspondence’ between ‘an 
influential English mining company and its New Zealand representative 
with regard to the accuracy of certain reports from “experts” received in 
London prior to flotation’.169 
In mid-1896, a London correspondent was pleased that London’s 
financial press was warning that ‘greater care’ should be used in selecting 
experts: 
 
It is very usual to find names of absolutely unknown men (mere 
mine managers of small adjoining properties) giving opinions on 
mines and their prospects. The value of real expert evidence is 
thereby seriously discounted. On several occasions I have heard 
city men inquire from some well-known mining man, “By the 
way, who is Mr Blank, whose reports on such and such a property 
have been sent me?” And the answer has too often been, “Don’t 
know the man.” 
 
He recorded an engineer involved in Western Australian mining 
blaming English investors for not employing reputable engineers because 
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they wanted to avoid paying ‘a decent fee’. The result was that vendors 
requiring good reports used ‘a man whose conscience is a little more elastic 
than it ought to be’ and encouraged him ‘to see possibilities which your 
reputable engineers, with years of experience before them, would not see’. 
This engineer also noted phony qualifications: ‘I took up a prospectus the 
other day, and I saw in it the name of a man who put “M.C.” after his name. 
I thought that man had something to do with the making of clothes. I saw a 
report of the same man, who put after his name “Q.E.” I afterwards found 
out that this meant “qualified expert” ’. He described being offered 
increasing amounts of money from an American to report favourably on a 
worthless mine.170  
Also in that year, the Observer published six sketches mocking the 
foreign mining ‘expert’ who ‘comes from no one knows where, causes a big 
flutter in the mining world in Auckland, fills his pockets with money and 
the minds of his admirers with great expectations, and disappears to 
Heaven only knows where’: 
 
The Mining Expert arrives in state, and is rushed by the local 
reporters for news of his intentions. He represents unlimited 
capital, and he comes here to buy up the goldfields of New 
Zealand. 
The Expert is rushed by the leading lights of the Chamber of 
Mines. “Buy this splendid property of mine. The other fellow’s 
properties are no good.” 
The Expert makes offers for unlikely properties. Deposit cheques 
not to be cashed until his permission is given. And he buys the 
scrip up cheaply and lives on the fat of the land, treated like a 
real live lord everywhere. 
Occasionally, he visits the workings of a mine and finds some 
difficulty to distinguish the baser minerals from gold. 
His offers for certain mines rush the scrip that he has bought at 
nominal prices up to big values. And he sells out. Then he takes 
his departure for the London market with heaps of plans and 
reports, which are dumped overboard soon after the steamer 
leaves port. 
And the speculator stays behind to nurse the baby and wait for 
the unlimited cash that never comes.171 
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Later that year, after their exaggerated claims were exposed, ‘a good 
many of our local mining experts’ were ‘dropping out of sight’ because ‘they 
would rather be forgotten’.172 Yet it was argued that the quality of reports 
had improved: 
 
Twenty-five years ago, the charges of experts for examining 
mines were very small compared with what they are now. The 
reason for this was that the country was overrun with men of 
ability, but without scruples, who expected, to say the least, 
better fees for good reports than bad. These venal people have 
been weeded out and can do no business. The result is that those 
who have withstood the tests receive princely fees, paid as much 
for their reputation for integrity as for ability. Often upon the 
report of one of these alone millions are invested without 
question. Curiously, there is a prejudice among many miners 
against the expert, and yet he is the best friend they have. He 
had killed more swindles and caused the opening up of more good 
mines than any other class of miners. He has done more than 
anyone else to discourage the dishonest promoter.173 
 
Later that year, the Observer reported that an expert ‘belonging to a 
big-name mining syndicate that has not done much so far, as rendered 
himself ridiculous by making a damning report on a Thames property that 
he lauded up to the skies before his appointment. A horse of a different 
colour now, eh?’174 One miner sarcastically noted one requirement of a 
prospectus to attract interest in London: ‘Two or three reports from mining 
experts who may or may not know something about mining, who have 
visited the property – whatever that may mean – and who have not too 
recently incurred public disfavour. These gentlemen usually have to look to 
a successful flotation to pay their fees’.175  
Blainey has noted ‘a crust of prejudice against geologists’, based on 
some inaccurate predictions in the 1850s. ‘It was conveniently forgotten 
that mine managers and metallurgists had made immeasurably more 
mistakes, and more costly, mistakes, than the geologists’. As most geologists 
were government employees, ‘they were condemned as impractical’. 
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The few geologists employed by mining companies in the 
nineteenth century spent most of their time reporting on leases 
that were about to be floated into companies; in making their 
reports they were invariably on new fields where few workings 
had uncovered essential evidence below ground level, and thus 
they made many mistakes. Only the optimistic geologist, likely to 
give a favourable report, was engaged by the mining promoters, 
and if his report was lukewarm it was not published.176 
 
Welton had a suggestion to make experts more responsible for the 
advice they provided: 
 
In bringing out new mining companies it is usual to make an 
estimate of the probable returns or output to be expected, the cost 
of placing the mine in a position to do this, and the estimated 
profit to be obtained, based upon the working costs at other 
mines. These estimates are presumably made by some competent 
person or mining engineer, who should to some extent be made 
responsible for such statements. In practice, very frequently 
nothing more is heard of this important person, and the money 
appears to be spent in any manner the directors may think 
proper, without reference to the engineer or person upon whose 
statements the company may have been formed. If the reporting 
engineer continued as consulting engineer to the company and 
appeared at the meetings of shareholders to answer questions, in 
all probability he would be more careful in making statements, as 
his reputation would greatly depend upon results.177 
 
FALSE REPORTS OF GOOD GOLD BEING STRUCK 
 
Announcing new discoveries was one way of increasing the value of 
shares, but, being an old trick, some investors were suspicious of such 
reports. For instance, in 1876 ‘Investor’ reminded a Thames newspaper of 
‘the experience of days gone by’ being repeated in  
 
the great fluctuation of the Waitekauri scrip. The scrip in this 
mine has been rising gently as the works of the battery and mine 
progressed, and warranted it. This morning, however, a 
gentleman arrived here in a steamer, all alone, and announced 
the startling news that gold had been struck somewhere in the 
mine.  
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Consequently, scrip shares immediately jumped in price. Whilst 
‘Investor’ insisted, probably disingenuously, that he was not insinuating 
that the man was repeating the ‘dodge of old days’ to enable some to rid 
themselves of their shares, he warned others not to ‘be led away by exciting 
news, for it damages the field and makes them disgusted with what they 
have done’. The value of the scrip should be ‘estimated by the amount of the 
dividends’.178 Directors and mine managers were accused of publishing 
‘absurd reports’ of a sudden increase in the value of ore, the implication 
being that they were disguising the true position to manipulate the 
market.179 Henry James Lee, a mining agent,180 when writing about share 
dealings at ‘Scrip Corner’ in Thames, gave an example of miners playing 
this game: 
 
Some of the miners used to try and create a run on the shares in a 
particular claim by leaving them for sale with a broker. Then one 
day a miner would rush breathless into the office and demand: 
“Have you sold my shares?” If the broker said he had, the answer 
would be, “Bad luck of it, and we have just struck it rich.” The 
man would take his cheque and walk away with a mournful air, 
while all the time the whole things was just a dodge to try and 
get the broker to bite.181 
 
When the 1890s boom was fading, it was claimed ‘that miners work all 
day and gamble all night. It is thus that booms are worked up’.182 
Responding to the government’s 1892 plan to forbid brokers and legal 
managers from being directors, ‘Obadiah’ pointed out that others also 
exploited the system: 
 
Mining managers and the men are to have all the fun and most of 
the cash to themselves, and they have most of it now, as is to be 
seen any day on ’Change [the Stock Exchange] when, without 
rhyme or reason, shares take a sudden jump, although no news 
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has reached the office. Presently, a telegram is posted, showing 
the why and wherefore. Do our present lawmakers think they can 
stop this? If so, they have lots of undeveloped faith. If a broker, 
being a shareholder, cannot sit on a board, then legal and mining 
managers should be stopped trafficking in the stock of a company 
in which they are employed.183 
 
It was perilous to accept the validity of all the reports made by mine 
managers, especially during a boom, as the Mining Standard revealed: 
 
The Manager of one of the prominent mines in Coromandel is 
certainly an artist in telegraphic managerial dispatches. At first 
his wires suggest that they are striking good ground, then a rich 
leader has been cut, followed by a report that the stone seems 
fairly good gold-bearing ore, next picked stone from the lode 
yields a splendid return on assay, and finally, a large quantity of 
same stone is at grass waiting to be bagged and shipped for 
treatment. By this time the shares have gradually arrived at a 
price enabling those in the know to unload at a small profit, 
thanks to the crescendo style of advertising indulged in by the 
manager. 
 
Then ‘no favourable reports come for a time, and the shares drop back 
again in price, and remain there until the time comes around for another 
flutter. It’s very pretty!’184 In 1875, ‘A Miner’ urged the press to ‘guard the 
unwary who are possessed of money against the mining sharper and false 
reporter who may succeed, through misrepresentation, in inducing the 
public to have faith in this or that mine in which they are interested’.185 
Writing in 1892 when the mining market was dull, ‘Obadiah’ noted that 
‘some marvellous reports’ had appeared recently. ‘Just look at that issued 
by the Australian director of the Great Mercury, and it will be seen that 
whatever is amongst the lost arts the faculty of writing glowing reports is 
not one of them’.186 When the 1890s boom was starting to fade, Francis 
Angus White, a leading mining agent and legal manager at Te Aroha and 
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elsewhere,187 warned that only ‘thoroughly reliable reports’ would ensure 
that capital for New Zealand mines would be raised in London.188 A mining 
inspector noted, in 1906, that a statement about the Waihi Reefs Extended 
ground was  
 
very vague and misleading as it says the property has been taken 
up for the purpose of prospecting land on the eastern side of the 
Martha (Waihi mine) but does not say whether it is 1 or 50 miles 
from the Martha mine or whether there are any claims between 
the ground taken up and the Martha or not.189 
 
Nevertheless, some miners and mine managers had a reputation for 
honesty. In 1896, ‘Obadiah’ noted that shares in the Woodstock Company at 
Karangahake were ‘holding their strength on the market. An honest 
manager means a lot to a mine’.190 The following year he wrote that the 
crushings were good, and would continue to be good, because this manager, 
John McCombie, was ‘not the man to boom his first crushings to an average 
he cannot maintain’.191 Earlier, McCombie had complained about 
 
glowing reports which the mine managers send, from time to 
time, about their mine prospects, which, however, are not borne 
out by subsequent battery returns. Not long since a certain mine 
manager wired to his directors that the ore, which was then being 
crushed from their mine, was shaping for a return of over two 
ounces per ton, whereas the final clean up did not give an average 
return of 15dwt per ton. Another manager reported 80 tons of ore 
ready for treatment, and the average value which he placed upon 
it was one and a half ounces per ton. It did not yield 5dwt per ton. 
A third one passed about 50 tons of ore through a battery, and the 
return was nothing or next to nothing. 
Erroneous and misleading reports of this description are not 
calculated to raise elevate the mining industry in the estimation 
of mining speculators, and I think it is high time some of the 
persons responsible should be brought to book for their 
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misrepresentations…. There is nothing to prevent any intelligent 
mine manager from determining the battery value of his ore by 
that very inexpensive and simple method called the “pestle 
mortar and dish process.” The very small sum of ten shillings will 
provide these implements, which are the only things required to 
ascertain the battery value of ore, near enough for all practical 
purposes.192 
 
McCombie was often critical of speculators: in one of his last 
newspaper articles, he mentioned an unnamed mine developed in 1895 
whose poor ore was ‘bulled’ to enable a company to be formed and an 
expensive plant erected. Shares were sold throughout New Zealand, even 
though the owners knew the mine was worthless and that the first crushing 
would kill it. The owners sabotaged their plant so that they could sell 
shares for another four months before this crushing.193 
Despite some miners being known as honest, investors were right be 
cautious. In 1905, some protested at false reports of good ore pushing up the 
prices of shares unrealistically.194 Although there were always some gullible 
investors, the Observer noted a healthy degree of cynicism over one mine 
manager’s report: 
 
They are a suspicious and cynical lot of men who dabble in 
goldmining scrip in Auckland. So it happened the other day, when 
the manager of the Portsea mine wired that he had cut a five feet 
reef, equal to the enormous yield of twenty ounces to the ton, that 
there were more sellers of scrip than buyers, and stock that ought 
on these prospects to have been worth £10 or £15 immediately fell 
from 2/8 to 2/4. These scrip punters had never met a manager 
who was so communicative when he had a good thing on hand, 
and like other sinners they doubted. And two days later they were 
laughing quietly in their sleeves when they read the assayers’ 
opinion that the twenty ounces were not gold but chrome. They 
had been there before.195 
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One mining agent wanted the issuing of ‘false and misleading Reports’ 
by mine managers or directors a criminal offence.196 ‘Obadiah’ 
recommended judging ‘a manager’s confidence in a mine by the shares he 
does or does or does not hold’.197 
 
DUBIOUS PROSPECTUSES 
 
As Curle had warned, investors should not believe an expert’s report 
attached to a prospectus unless it was written by ‘a man well-known, of 
admittedly honest character’, or could pass the scrutiny of experienced men. 
As for the prospectus, this was no guide, being ‘a string of eloquently 
worded inanities’.198 The prospectus would often contain the names of 
people likely to attract investors. In New Zealand as elsewhere, ‘shares 
were given away to certain men, whose names, appearing in the prospectus, 
acted as a sort of bait for a too gullible public’. Shares given away in this 
manner were ‘counted as capital’,199 thereby misrepresenting the true state 
of the company. The Thames Star was critical of Auckland speculators who 
leant ‘the weight of their name’ to dubious ventures to enhance their 
prospects, ‘with a view to realizing as speedily as possible’.200 During the 
boom of the 1890s, ‘A Small Investor’ stated that ‘several mining companies 
have been floated on the strength of a few names supposed to be good on the 
subscribers sheet’. He suspected that they received ‘a few shares, and so 
inducing the public to follow in the steps of these honourable, upright 
gentlemen’.201 English companies relied on titled men, no matter if they 
were nonentities ‘financially, mentally, or morally’, to entice investors.202 
There were many such morally dubious promoters.203 ‘Obadiah’ agreed that 
questionable properties were being  
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floated on the strength of the ground – sometimes because the 
next company has a reef (buck or otherwise) in hand, and 
sometimes because the names of the promoters are “good.” The 
latter recommendation is the worst of the lot. These “names” are 
used for everything that will not go off otherwise, and invariably 
the owners of the names are “put into” the thing at no cost to 
themselves. They get promoter’s shares for the use of their 
names. They don’t put up any of their own money. Therefore, the 
investing public should not put too much faith in what are called 
“good names.”204 
 
The main figures in the Broken Hill Proprietary, when included on the 
share lists of other companies, usually ‘received promoters’ shares at 
bargain prices and the money they contributed was less important than the 
name which they lent; they were the bellwethers whose fame enticed the 
timid sheep to enter the share lists’.205 Even in small mines, ‘miners would 
‘ask a man to take a share – especially if they think he is a man of influence 
– and think that it adds to the value of a claim’.206 
Some of these ‘names’ also became directors, leading to ‘sultry’ 
meetings of shareholders in Auckland after the collapse of the 1890s boom. 
Shareholders had realized that ‘in most cases’ directors had not ‘the 
slightest knowledge of mining or business’, and were ‘simply deadheads’ 
who attended board meetings for the half-sovereign they received. ‘They 
know nothing of the mine, in fact, in a number of cases they couldn’t tell you 
where it is’.207  
It was possible for shareholders to sue promoters if they had ‘been 
misled by false statements in the prospectus’, but one miner pointed out 
that ‘usually the final sufferers have bought in some time after flotation, 
and even if they were among the original shareholders they either have not 
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the money to spare for legal expenses or do not consider it politic to send 
good money after bad’.208 
 
NO TITLE, OR AN INSECURE ONE 
 
Selling shares in a claim or a company without a title to the ground 
sometimes occurred. During the Te Aroha rush, a young man had been 
persuaded to buy a claim of one man’s ground for £18. The seller then left 
the district.  
 
The purchaser has since discovered that the claim is in dispute, 
the seller having pegged out illegally. Indeed we understand he 
admitted that in marking-out he only inserted one peg, thinking 
that that was all that was required for one man’s ground. It is 
probable that on finding his mistake he got out of his bad 
bargain, 
 
at the buyer’s expense.209 In 1895, some brokers floated companies and 
traded in shares in properties that had not been granted by the warden.210 
These claims had not been surveyed and might overlap.211 A Paeroa 
correspondent found it ‘hard to conjecture’ what the ‘ultimate result’ would 
be when investors found they had ‘bought shares in a company which has 
no ground’.212  
Those who had pegged out were in no hurry to have surveys made, for 
they could sell interests before the ground was secured.213 A Thames 
newspaper suggested as a way to check wild cat propositions with their half 
a dozen enticing specimens was to forbid company formation until title to 
the land had been acquired.  
 
Such a provision would at least prevent all trafficking in scrip 
until the completion of the survey, and we would not witness the 
strange spectacle of a full-blown company, with legal manager, 
auditors, &c, closing its books to try and discover the ground 
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which would seem to have existed only in the fond imaginations 
of the promoters.214  
 
One such case at Coromandel in 1896 led an investor to sue for her 
money back.215  
Of concern to foreign investors was that, even if title was legally 
granted, it was insecure, as John McCombie explained:  
 
A miner’s title to a mineral area hinges on his being able to 
comply with certain labour clauses, and failing compliance he is 
at the mercy of any one of the many individuals who are ever 
ready to turn an honest penny by paying a plaint against his title 
for no other purpose than a speculative one. The only redeeming 
feature in this connection is that the Warden has large 
discretionary powers, when dealing with such cases, but it does 
not follow that he is always able to exercise these powers in the 
right direction, no matter how much he may be inclined that way. 
For instance, he may have to deal with men who will not stick at 
truth if lies will serve their purpose.216 
 
STOCKBROKERS 
 
Nobody dealing in shares could be trusted. A correspondent who briefly 
visited Thames in 1871 exposed the tricks played by ‘the knowing ones, and 
the deeply initiated, who never expose the cards they hold in their hands 
unless they have an object to gain’. He claimed to quote the exact words of 
his discussion with an old friend who had become a sharebroker: 
 
“I know people are under the impression that the sharemarket is 
always being rigged. This is not true – not that shareholders 
would not do it if they could, but it is always difficult, and in nine 
cases out of ten impossible. Now I will take the holders of 
Caledonians, Tookeys, or any other good-paying mine. Well, there 
are always two interests opposing each other, which effectually 
neutralises any attempt to rig the market. There are 
shareholders who wish to sell, and their game is to praise up the 
mine in which they hold scrip; there are again those who wish to 
buy in, and of course they will raise all kinds of reports to 
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depreciate it, but invariably neither one believes the other. And 
again, without the co-operation of a large number of shareholders, 
nothing in the way of rising or lowering the price of shares can be 
accomplished. The shareholders are too dispersed for this. Some 
are on the Thames, some at Auckland, others in Otago, Victoria, 
and elsewhere. It may be that some smart unprincipled fellow 
will now and again mislead another to his own advantage, but the 
cases are very exceptional. Every one engaged in share traffic 
doubts the word of every one else following the same business 
that any reports which are raised respecting a mine are always as 
a rule discredited.” “Tell me,” I asked of my friend, “how you 
account for this. Yesterday the brokers reported in the journals 
that Caledonians opened at £100, and closed at £107. Now this 
was a rise in price of seven per cent between, we will say, ten 
o’clock in the morning and five in the afternoon, whilst there was 
nothing new as affecting the mine. Every one was aware of its 
being swamped out [flooded], and that nothing further could be 
ascertained of it for some days; - what is it causes this rising and 
falling of shares in mines where there has been no change in their 
appearance, nor any fresh discoveries made as to the increase or 
decrease of the returns likely to come from them?” “My dear 
child,” said my versatile and widely experienced friend, “share 
dealers are a class of men who deem themselves wonderfully wise 
in their day and generation. Did you ever see a flock of sheep 
where, when one made a bolt with no knowledge whether it was 
going into a clover paddock or a slaughter-house, the others all 
followed in succession? The sheep followed their leaders according 
to their instinct, and share dealers do the same. Look here now 
for a case in point. It was known this morning that one of the 
clever ones had bought Caledonians at £105. “By George,” says 
Brown, “if Smith has gone in at that price, Caledonians are all 
right. He’s up to the wrinkles” [smart dodges, tricks].217 So Brown 
goes to Jones, who is a holder of that particular scrip, and offers 
to buy at a hundred and five; but Jones don’t see it, for he has 
heard what Smith has been doing. He will let ’em slide at a 
hundred and seven ten [£107 10s], but don’t care much about 
parting with them at that figure. Well, Brown buys at the 
hundred and seven ten. Then the news gets wind that 
Caledonians are rising like wildfire; Robinson sees a good thing in 
it, and gets a few, quite as a sort of favour, at a hundred and nine; 
and the report is still that the market is going up. At five o’clock 
shares, which in the morning were parted with at £105, are now 
held for £112. Outsiders will say the market has been rigged, 
when there has been no rigging attempted. It is the eagerness of 
speculators to get hold of a good thing which has improved the 
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tone of the market. The shares are intrinsically worth no more 
this afternoon than they were this morning, but you see, dear boy, 
what has caused it all. To-morrow they may go up to £120, and 
next week it is not impossible they will have fallen below this 
morning’s figure. It is the trying to do a ‘smart thing’ which 
brings about these fluctuations; but as to any deliberate and 
combined attempt to rig the market, you may take my word for it 
that it is all bunkum. I don’t say that attempts have not been 
made occasionally, because I know there have, but they never 
answered their purpose…. The fact is, men play at share dealing 
as they play at cards. Some study every move and change in the 
market as an old and steady whist player studies his opponent’s 
hand, and who, if he be the better player, is sure to win in the 
long run; others prefer games of chance, as they are more 
exciting, and the carrying off a whole pool is so much more 
pleasing than games which require the exercise of patience, skill, 
and calculation before one can become proficient. Share dealing is 
gambling simple et pure, where a rich specimen from a mine is a 
trump card, which must be played so as to make the tricks.”  
 
Shares were ‘as often sold below what the holder has paid for them as 
they are sold above it’. His friend explained that those who made money 
‘tangibly and without risk’ from ‘share-trafficking’ were sharebrokers. Some 
of the ‘about 160’ of these at Thames ‘make and save money, others get a 
bare existence’. They normally received two-and-a-half per cent upon all 
shares sold. If a share had ‘changed hands 40 times since it was first issued 
by the company it represents, you will see 100 per cent on the full value of 
the share has been paid for commission. Now, there are quantities of shares 
which have changed hands twice 40 times over’. He argued that brokers had 
‘to be tolerably honest or they would soon find their business fail’, and he 
considered them ‘no better nor any worse than any other business men’.218  
In 1884, a merchant complained about the ‘air of respectability’ given 
to speculative ventures ‘through the broker who transacts the business’, but 
added that brokers were ‘completely powerless to alter the state of things’. 
He was ‘satisfied’ that Thames brokers were aware of this and ‘would much 
prefer to see legitimate work carried on’, and most ‘warned their clients of 
the nature of many of these transactions’.219 Others were less sure, the 
Observer in particular regularly criticizing brokers. In 1890 one of its 
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columnists was concerned at their ‘almost unlimited power. If a stock keeps 
at a high price for any time and they wish it to fall, or if they hold a lot of 
one particular line and wish to “boom” it, they have only to alter the 
quotations on the board and the trick is done’.220 When brokers were 
directors of mining companies it weakened ‘public confidence when they 
know that it is to the interest of those in charge to cause stock to fluctuate. 
One prefers stock to be steady, and this is exactly what the brokers don’t 
want. Directors should be men who understand the mine, not the 
market’.221 Another Observer reporter partly relieved the brokers of blame: 
‘How long will the investing public be gulled, not so much by those wicked 
brokers, as by their own evil imaginations? If an ounce of gold is worth 52s, 
why should a grain of expectation be worth £20?’222 He continued to urge 
investors to ‘go in for more legitimate mining, and less stock gambling’, 
opposing the 
 
senseless system of sticking up sensational telegrams whenever a 
few colours of gold are found. A rush is made for shares, the devil 
take the hindmost, all being anxious not to be left out. Hence the 
rise, and whence the fall? Then the brokers get the blame, but 
why the public should blame the brokers for their own action has 
always been to me a mystery.223 
 
‘Obadiah’ considered there was ‘a certain amount of truth’ in the view 
that most mines ‘were worked for the benefit of the market and not of the 
shareholders’.224 To the Thames Star, ‘the curse under which this district 
has laboured in the past’ was mining being ‘subservient to the 
sharemarket’, with efforts ‘made at fixed periods to “rig” the market’.225 It 
reprinted an article from the Australian Mining Standard arguing that 
there were ‘few worse features’ than ‘for the broker charged with the 
flotation of a company to be also the legal manager or secretary, or for a 
firm of brokers to be charged with the flotation, and a member of the firm to 
be the legal manager of secretary’.  
                                            
220 ‘Boomerang’, ‘Stock Exchange Notes: The Brokers, the Boom and the Public’, Observer, 
20 September 1890, p. 7. 
221 ‘Boomerang’, ‘Stock Exchange Notes’, Observer, 4 October 1890, p. 6. 
222 ‘Gold Mining Report’, Observer, 1 January 1891, p. 12. 
223 ‘Obadiah’, ‘Shares and Mining’, Observer, 31 December 1892, p. 14. 
224 ‘Obadiah’, ‘Shares and Mining’, Observer, 28 February 1891, p. 15. 
225 Editorial, Thames Star, 21 January 1891, p. 3. 
55 
 
The identity of interests is opposed to the well being of 
shareholders. The broker, perceiving that the shares are “going 
off” well, perceives also that if he plays his cards “properly” he 
will be able to make more than his bare commission out of the 
flotation. He can do this by declaring the list closed. Then when 
some inquirer for shares drops in, he expresses regret that all the 
shares have gone; but he had had a few placed in his hands by 
some one “who has taken more than he actually requires,” and 
some of these the inquirer can have – at a premium of 10 or 20 
per cent. 
 
It did not claim that there was fraud ‘in every case in which the broker 
and the secretary are one or virtually one person’, but it was ‘very 
commonly practiced’.226 In 1895, a Thames Star editorial condemned ‘one or 
two share jobbers’ [cheats]227 who were opposing the amalgamation of some 
local mines.  
 
Everyone knows how a sharebroker and jobber – especially one 
who does not confine himself to the legitimate business of 
sharebroking, but who traffics openly in shares himself – can 
exert an influence upon those about him. He is the worst class of 
individual connected with mining, and … is a curse to any 
goldfield. He does not scruple to sacrifice the best interests of the 
industry for his own selfish ends. His sole and only aim is to 
make money, no matter at whose expense. 
 
It wanted the government to force jobbers to declare themselves as 
such, for ‘the name of sharebroker for them is a misnomer’. Legitimate 
brokers were ‘a necessity, but “jobbers” under the name of sharebrokers are 
an unquestionable evil and a curse to the goldfield’.228 
During a Legislative Council debate in 1895 on a proposal to prevent 
sharebrokers speculating for themselves and their families, one councillor 
commented that ‘the amount being invested by fools in mining schemes 
which could never be a success was simply prodigious. For the production of 
these bubbles the sharebrokers were responsible, for they always made the 
first and immediate profit out of them’.229 In July 1896, the Observer 
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reported that ‘the knowing push who have been putting up option money 
and withdrawing it after making their “scoop,” have about come to the end 
of their tether’.230 ‘Obadiah’ provided an illustration: ‘A little syndicate in 
the Exchange, not altogether unconnected with the Chamber of Mines ... 
have developed several little “option for flotation” schemes. Buy in shares, 
sell when at a premium, withdraw the option, and leave the “battlers” 
lamenting with their big priced scrip to nurse’.231 During the 1890s boom, 
‘some queer stories’ were told of the ‘trickeries’ of brokers, but despite 
hinting that these might be publicized,232 ‘Obadiah’ refrained from 
providing any details, possibly on legal grounds. Earlier, a justice of the 
peace was ‘committed to the Asylum as being of unsound mind. He has been 
eccentric for some time, and certain sharebrokers took advantage of his 
lunacy to “work off” shares on him at high prices’.233  
In December 1896, an Auckland Shareholders Protection Association 
was formed to prevent advantage being taken of those who ‘jump at 
anything in the way of a mining property’. At its inaugural meeting, one 
member attacked ‘the loose manner in which brokers dealt with shares’: 
 
He stated a man could now go into the exchange and ask Mr “So-
and-So” to buy him a 1000 scrip in a property at a certain price. 
This would perhaps be in the morning, and the intending buyer 
having business to attend to, would probably be unable to see the 
broker again until the evening. In the meantime the broker might 
turn the shares over two or three times during the day to his own 
advantage, and when asked if he had bought the shares as 
directed would as likely as not say that he could not obtain them. 
It was noticeable, however, that if there was a fall in price during 
the day, he always had them when the purchaser called. This had 
happened to his own knowledge.234 
 
In 1903, the Observer believed there would ‘never be any market for 
mining stocks in Auckland until certain brokers discontinue the practice of 
over-selling’.235 The following year, over-selling was blamed for ‘the 
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frequent excitability of the market’.236 Five years later the chairman of the 
Auckland Stock Exchange referred to ‘time and forward sales’ tempting 
speculators with small means ‘to plunge on time much beyond their ability 
to carry’.237 ‘Obadiah’ was concerned about the ‘pernicious’ practice of 
overselling shares, which was aided by ‘the custom of buying shares on tick’. 
He urged clients to ask for their transfers and pay for their shares.238 A 
newspaper cited a broker who was worried about overselling, which had 
‘resulted in the public fighting shy of mining investments’. He claimed that 
‘the prices of mining stocks for some time past had been absolutely 
controlled by the overselling fraternity, who attacked practically every stock 
on the Exchange list’. These ‘bears’ could do this safely, ‘as there was no 
opposition to them’. He wanted oversellers fined for the first offence and 
imprisoned for subsequent offences. It should be ‘obligatory on brokers to 
state the name of sellers on the contract notes’. The government had 
legislated against bookmakers, but why not ‘against overselling, which is 
probably the worst form of gambling in existence’.239  
In 1906 a Waihi newspaper reported the belief that brokers had a 
‘dangerous power’ to manipulate the value of shares ‘by means of buyers 
and sellers’ who were ‘not buyers and sellers in the genuine sense of the 
term. The practice of deliberate overselling, and even that of forward sales’ 
could not ‘be too rigorously condemned, as the result is the victimising of 
the bona fide investing public’. It approvingly cited the Observer: ‘Has 
anyone ever known a sharebroker to refuse the order of a client to buy or 
sell stock in the most utterly wildcat venture so long as there was a 
commission hanging to it? In an experience extending over a great many 
years, we have only known one such instance’.240 As a Thames 
correspondent stated, ‘the steady market value of a mine does not suit 
brokers…. The sudden rise and fall of mining stock is work and wealth for 
them’.241 To try to control brokers, in 1910 the chairman of the Auckland 
Stock Exchange asked the government ‘to insist on the company’s register 
disclosing the whole of the transactions by showing by whom the shares 
                                            
236 Observer, 8 October 1904, p. 7. 
237 Auckland Weekly News, 16 December 1909, p. 32. 
238 ‘Obadiah’, ‘Shares and Mining’, Observer, 16 September 1911, p. 20. 
239 Auckland Weekly News, 17 August 1911, p. 22. 
240 Editorial, Waihi Daily Telegraph, 13 March 1906, p. 3. 
241 Thames Correspondent, Auckland Weekly News, 9 March 1878, p. 18. 
58 
were sold and purchased and the folio number of the shares’. Asked to add a 
time limit, he added to his resolution 
 
“And that the register be not allowed to be more than seven days 
in arrear.” 
Mr Shepherd: I would not give them seven days, It is time enough 
to ruin the market. 
Chorus of Members: Three days. 
The Chairman: We will make it three days, then. 
Mr A.J. Tapper: The legal time is 24 days. 
Mr Hull: I have known registers to be three months behind. 
 
Members also wanted all books recording transfers open to 
shareholders and the public.242 The following year, shareholders attending a 
meeting about the Ross goldfield complained that a large number of the 
shares held in Auckland ‘were brokers’ shares, the holders of which were 
not interested so much in the mine as in the market’. They opposed 
sharebrokers holding a large number of shares, because that made them 
personally interested in shares which they advised investors about.243 
Nor were some lawyers to be trusted; during the boom, one Auckland 
solicitor, ‘using the information derived professionally from a client, paid 
the license fee of a mine and collared the property’.244 The Observer asked 
whether all the mining solicitors got the same ‘cut’ as a ‘well known’ 
Auckland barrister, ‘who “cut off” 8,000 shares for himself out of a little 
agreement between two simple prospectors, above ordinary fees. The usual 
thing, he said’.245  
‘A. Victim, Esq’, wrote a brief poem entitled ‘The Sharebroker in 
Heaven’: 
 
Where Hauraki’s sunny fountains roll down their golden sand, 
He made his cash by mountains, and seeks the Better Land. 
With many sweet confloptions he’ll consecrate his hauls, 
He’ll give the Angels options, and teach them “cats” and calls.246 
 
UNDER-CAPITALISED MINING  
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An 1870 report on Thames described the result of introducing a leasing 
system that encouraged the formation of companies with fictitious nominal 
capital. Upon its introduction, mines ceased working while their owners 
 
sought more profitable employment in the promotion of 
companies, which were floated, each with a nominal capital 
having an extravagant proportion to the value of the property, to 
the amount of work done, and to the real available capital of the 
company. Then was commenced that furor in speculation, 
amounting almost to positive insanity, which, in one form or 
other, seems to have prevailed on every gold field. The proper 
work of mining was neglected by the more tempting bait of profits 
on the sale of scrip, the price of which was only governed by the 
caprice of the dealer in the article.247 
 
An Australian mining expert who visited Ohinemuri in the mid-1880s 
made flattering remarks about the reefs but commented that the system of 
mining in Hauraki was ‘but a mere piece of jockyism’, meaning a ‘relentless 
presentation of irrelevant, unrelated facts in apparent support of a popular 
notion or campaign’,248 compared with how mines were opened up in 
Australia: 
 
There the work of developing mines ... is gone about in a 
systematic manner with a capital varying from £25,000 to 
£100,000, and I could note innumerable instances where every 
cent of the money had been expended before a colour of gold was 
obtainable. Here your so-called mining investors contribute just 
enough money to do the preliminary work such as purchasing 
mining requisites, building smithy, etc, and because fickle Dame 
Nature has not deposited the metals close to the surface, so as to 
enable them to get immediate returns, they throw up the sponge 
and declare the mine a duffer.... You appear to be afraid to put 
your heads under ground; you scratch a little here and a little 
there, hoping to pick up a stray color or two at a very small 
outlay. Now there is nothing that I know of which has a more 
injurious effect on mining than this scratching process. If a mine 
is worth taking up, it is surely worth a thorough prospecting, and 
mining here will never be up to much till your mining men and 
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investors generally look upon it as a legitimate undertaking, and 
work their properties accordingly. 
 
The Ohinemuri correspondent of the Te Aroha News, who had quoted 
these views, felt ‘obliged to admit’ their truth: 
 
Very little money has been expended there in the actual 
development of the mines, and that little has been frittered away 
in the work that is of no practical benefit either to the district or 
to the different companies under whose supervision it was carried 
out. Gambling and speculating in shares is undoubtedly the great 
deterring element to the success of legitimate mining. I myself am 
acquainted with quite a number of men who would rather lose 
thousands of pounds in share transactions than put one shilling 
into the legitimate development of a mine.249 
 
The Te Aroha News reported an Australian expert’s opinions that New 
Zealand mines were under-capitalised and under-prospected compared with 
Australia’s.  
 
The so-called mining investors contribute just enough money to 
do the preliminary work such as purchasing mining requisites, 
building smithy, etc, and because fickle Dame Nature has not 
deposited the metals close to the surface, so as to enable them to 
get immediate returns, they throw up the sponge and declare the 
mine a duffer. 
 
Investors should look upon mining ‘as a legitimate undertaking, and 
work their properties accordingly.250 In 1892, ‘Obadiah’ complained about 
‘attempting to work too many companies with the limited capital at our 
disposal…. Little, if any, of the money paid for scrip ever finds its way to 
assist in paying wages’, and he doubted if ‘floating old mines with new 
names’ would improve matters. What was required was ‘ample capital’ 
enabling thorough development.251 An Englishman writing about Auckland 
mining companies in the 1890s stated, exaggerating for effect, that 
although the nominal price of shares was commonly five shillings, the 
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amount called up was ‘often only a penny, sometimes twopence, or in very 
extravagant companies threepence’.252 
There were many examples throughout the peninsula of struggling 
under-capitalized mines. Despite having an impressive nominal capital, 
most of this was not available for mining. In 1878 a Thames correspondent 
complained that companies were subsisting on ‘fictitious capital’. He wanted 
promoters to ‘give a guarantee of their bona fides by lodging in a bank a 
certain proportion of the capital let out’. Even when the mine was profitable 
and paid dividends, he accused directors of  
 
paying to the last pound instead of reserving a portion for 
developing the resources of their property; by so doing, starving 
the mine, and ultimately being compelled to adopt the tribute 
system. They often ignore the fact that a reserve fund of cash 
adds materially to the stability and value of any undertaking; 
and for the purpose of dispensing dividends to themselves and 
others, they frequently pay all the available balance out, as if a 
recurrence of such dividends was safe.253 
 
In 1881 it was reported, as clearly being unusual, that the Martha 
Gold Mining and Quartz Crushing Company was to spend all the capital 
raised on mining, the shareholders not receiving any paid up shares, and all 
shares being equally liable to pay calls.254 In 1888, a newspaper complained 
that, with only one or two exceptions, Hauraki mines had never been placed 
‘upon a basis such as would ensure their being permanently and 
continuously worked’. At Thames in particular, the first miners found 
‘extremely rich’ lodes near the surface ‘and with very little trouble and 
expense large and valuable returns were obtained’. As it was assumed this 
would continue, most companies had ‘altogether inadequate’ capital for 
‘proper and thorough development’.  
 
When rich returns were obtained, shareholders were too ready to 
divide the whole of the profits, under the impression that they 
were possessed of a property that would continue to pay 
unlimited dividends with but little care and nursing, and that it 
was unnecessary to lay aside a portion of their income for the 
exigencies of a “rainy day.” 
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When rich returns proved not to be permanent and ore was refractory 
and unpayable even with improved batteries, shareholders became 
‘disheartened’ and were unwilling to subscribe capital for development.255 
In 1897, a mining reporter explained this behaviour as being partly a 
consequence of being a young country: 
 
Aucklanders had taken sufficient gold from the Thames field 
alone to prospect and open up every part of the Hauraki 
Peninsula, and to supply crushing mills to every mining centre; 
but they had managed their mining business so badly that they 
had not reserved sufficient money, even from rich mines, to 
prospect other parts of the claim. The usual method was to take 
out every ounce of gold as quickly as possible, and pay every cent 
away in dividends. So soon as the rich reef was worked out they 
had no capital to work deeper levels or explore for other lodes. 
This state of things is natural enough in a young country, where 
ready money is such a scarce and valuable commodity that a man 
cannot afford to hold it. Capital has had no time to grow here. 
Profits are not allowed to accumulate.256 
 
WEAK COMPANIES 
 
A Thames example revealed a common financial imperative for 
forming companies. Charles David Lindsey McLean,257 who had managed 
two mines during the Te Aroha rush,258 later managed the Orlando mine at 
Thames. In 1891 he wrote that he had been ‘for about four years working on 
my own account’ and had ‘been compelled from want of funds to float into a 
Company the mine of which I was part owner and of which I am now 
manager’.259   
Floating companies was easy, indeed too easy. In 1888 it was reported 
that an ‘Auckland syndicate maker’ who undertook to float a Thames mine 
‘completed the job in two minutes’, thereby earning £1,000 a minute.260 Two 
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years later, a Stock Exchange columnist considered the 40 companies 
seeking capital as ‘far too many for a market like ours’, as there was ‘not 
enough money to keep it up’.261 The chief cause of the excessive number of 
companies was that 
 
Those who invest in new claims seem anxious to get profit from 
the market, rather than the mine. Why on earth should a 
syndicate, as soon as formed, go into scrip before any work has 
been done? It would be infinitely better if mines were worked as 
syndicates, till they are fully developed, and then if you like turn 
them into scrip.262 
 
The following year, ‘Obadiah’ considered ‘it would be better for the 
mines if a third of the present companies ceased to exist’.263 Immediately 
after this was published, Richard Seddon, then Minister of Mines, 
announced that he intended to change the way mines were floated: 
 
As an instance of what happened under the present system, he 
said that a man went to Auckland from Thames with a property 
for which he got £100, to which he was entitled. The purchaser, 
however, took it to Sydney, and got £3,000, and then the Sydney 
people got six months protection and floated the property in 
London for £30,000. He thought if this £30,000 were spent on the 
field, instead of going into the pockets of speculators, it would be 
better for the country.264 
 
In 1908, members of the Auckland Stock Exchange considered that too 
many companies were being floated, and that it would be better to 
concentrate on a few good properties. ‘The market was simply being ruined 
with so many shares placed upon it’, and the public must appreciate that 
members of the exchange ‘took no responsibility whatever as to the 
prospects’ of these companies.265 These problems continued, and the 
following year the chairman noted another mining boom with ‘the usual 
crop of new or resuscitated mining ventures’. Too many companies meant 
that ‘the limited capital available for mine development’ was scattered ‘over 
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too wide an area with the result that few, if any, of our local ventures got a 
thorough and systematic testing’.266 
 
INADEQUATE WORKING CAPITAL 
 
One financial journal noted that normally ‘about one-half of the 
nominal capital of a company may be taken as representing vendors’ shares, 
and a considerable slice of the remaining half sometimes finds its way into 
the pockets of the vendors as well; the balance may represent the working 
capital put into the venture’.267 Welton insisted that for a mine ‘with an 
abundance of ore of low grade the nominal capital must be large, and the 
proportion of working capital to the price paid for the property also large, to 
provide for the cost of extensive plant and allow of the necessary 
development of the mining works’.268 Working capital ‘should rather be 
ample than the reverse, to cover contingencies, and to prevent 
disappointment to the shareholders, as a balance in hand’ after a plant was 
erected was ‘more satisfactory than having to raise fresh capital’.269 He 
blamed ‘the large number of reconstructions of Australian companies, and 
the failure of many of these’, on ‘hundreds’ of companies being formed 
without having any concept of the amount of working capital required.270  
In 1880, the Thames Star was ‘glad to notice’ that recently ‘an entirely 
new principle’ had been adopted when floating companies: 
 
We refer to the relegation of a considerable portion of the money 
derived from the promoters’ shares to the credit of the company 
wherewith to start operations. Hitherto the programme has too 
often been: A piece of ground is pegged off, shares in it sold, the 
money finding its way solely into the pockets of the promoters; 
and no work being done from the dislike of people to pay calls to 
try virgin ground, in a few months time the once vaunted G. M. 
Co’s property appears in the Warden’s list of forfeited holdings.271 
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All the case studies of companies, whether local and foreign, formed in 
the Te Aroha Mining District reveal that none had adequate working 
capital. By early 1884, when 30 companies owned ground at Waiorongomai, 
although their combined nominal capital totalled £632,000, only £20,366 
had been paid up.272 A year later, when the number had fallen to 17, their 
capital was £345,000, of which £14,000 was paid up.273 As another example 
of being under-resourced, the Canadian Company, formed in 1882, had a 
nominal capital of £20,000, but by 1887 the paid up capital, which included 
promoters’ shares, was only £1,892. Calls produced £892, and as the total 
value of ore extracted was only £916, no dividends had been paid.274 The 
following year, all its assets were sold to the Battery Company for £707 
11s.275 After his first year managing the Alphabet Company, John 
Goldsworthy, an experienced manager,276 was praised for having ‘certainly 
displayed a considerable amount of tact and mining experience in the able 
manner in which he has opened up the ground, considering the small 
amount of money that has been spent’.277 That paucity of funds was typical 
of small mines throughout the peninsula had been earlier illustrated when 
his brother William,278 later to manage mines at Waiorongomai,279 was 
praised in 1876 for having ‘done a great deal of work for very little money’ 
as manager of the Welcome mine at Waitekauri. He had ‘done well for the 
shareholders’.280  
Companies with a combination of low-grade ore and inadequate 
financial resources quickly had to abandon their ground. For instance, the 
Canterbury Company, formed in November 1883 to work ground near the 
proposed New Era battery,281 had a nominal capital of £15,000 in 30,000 
shares, of which 22,500 were subscribed. Of the latter, 7,500 were held by 
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the company.282 Less than two months later, one of its miners sued for £9, 
which, when unpaid, resulting in a distress warrant being issued for what, 
with legal expenses, had become £10 6s. The bailiff discovered that the 
company had no assets to pay this small debt.283 To obtain his money, in 
October 1884 the miner successfully applied for an order winding up the 
company so that its assets could be liquidated.284 
Commenting on Hauraki in general, ‘Obadiah’ wrote in 1897 that, 
during the recent boom, many properties floated with a working capital of 
‘£800 or £1000 - or less - have spent their capital without getting anything 
like payable results’. Now realizing ‘only too well how useless small capital’ 
was, companies were being wound up for lack of funds.285 As a typical 
example of the amount of capital allocated for mining during the 1890s, 
when the shareholders of the All Nations Licensed Holding, at Stoney 
Creek, decided in 1895 to form a company, the number of shares was fixed 
at 50,000 of 5s each. A third were allotted to the promoters as paid up to 2s 
and the remainder was offered to the public for 3d on application and 3d on 
allotment, calls not to exceed 3d per month. The Te Aroha News considered 
‘one good feature’ was that ‘the whole of the capital’ would be ‘expended in 
developing the mine’.286 As almost all the capital was subscribed 
immediately, £4,000 was allocated for prospecting 100 acres that included 
the main claims occupied in the 1880 rush.287 As the real reason for forming 
companies at this time was to sell them to overseas interests, after only a 
month’s work and spending between £150 and £200 the property was under 
offer in England.288 Whilst awaiting the outcome, only £500 was spent in 
development.289  
This ground was sold to English investors in the following year. Out of 
a capital of £120,000, the new company would spend £20,000 developing the 
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mine. The local owners received £1,750 in cash and 35,000 paid up shares, 
the English vendors receiving the largest portion of profit.290 Protection was 
granted while arrangements were finalized and machinery arrived from 
America for a battery and reduction works, the mine being idle during the 
negotiations.291 An engineer arrived from San Francisco with the machinery 
in November,292 but the company failed to make a success of its purchase. 
According to the recollections of one man who mined nearby, ‘though 
thousands of pounds was spent on the plant the man put in charge wouldn’t 
do nothing but draw his salary’.293 Whatever the defects of the battery 
manager and the small sum spent opening up the mine, the inadequacy of 
the ore was even more pertinent. 
Many small local companies had difficulty in raising capital, as in the 
case of the Te Aroha Quartz Crushing Company, floated in 1881,294 or were 
under-capitalized. In the opinion of the Vice-President of the Mining 
Institute of Scotland, Henry Cadell, the decline in Hauraki mining by 1890 
was partly caused by most mines being ‘in the hands of local people of little 
means and small intelligence’. This unkind comment was a reference to the 
owners not developing mines properly but instead spending any proceeds on 
dividends.295 This charge could not be levied against most Waiorongomai 
miners, for dividends were only issued in the early days of the New Find 
and Colonist companies and to members of the Loyalty and Palace 
syndicate during its few years of success.296  
Cadell considered that, because small companies, ‘without adequate 
working capital’, had ‘proved quite incapable’ of developing mines 
adequately, outside capital was required, along with larger areas of 
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ground.297 ‘Obadiah’ agreed, writing in 1891 that no longer could ‘the 
Auckland investing public … successfully stagger under so many small 
companies’.298 In 1902, an English observer of goldmining throughout the 
world warned against taking shares in a company with insufficient working 
capital: ‘The smallest amount of working capital asked for ought to be 
£30,000 in the case of a speculative venture, and £50,000 if anything 
specific or definite is undertaken, such as sinking a deep level shaft, or 
driving a tunnel to locate the continuation of any reef’. Very few mines 
could be ‘developed and equipped on a sound scale’ even by the larger 
amount. Potential investors should ‘find out how much of the working 
capital stipulated for has actually been subscribed’.299 Another mining 
commentator, reflecting on 25 years’ involvement in the industry, warned 
that when reading a prospectus ‘a most important point to see’ was whether 
the capital was sufficient: ‘not the NOMINAL, but the WORKING 
CAPITAL’. The latter was ‘insufficient in nine cases out of a dozen, bringing 
companies to an end or reconstruction before their properties have been put 
into fair working order’.300 
In 1893, Henry Andrew Gordon, the Inspecting Engineer of the Mines 
Department, noted that 
 
The introduction of mining companies with large nominal 
capitals, very little of which was ever called up, has not been a 
real benefit to the mining industry. These companies have 
purchased the ground on which the individual miner used to 
spend his all upon; and in cases where a venture turns out well 
the dividends are, in many instances, expended in other channels 
than mining. The price of shares is run up, and the miner, in 
order to have an interest in the company, pays far more than the 
intrinsic value of the share. In many instances he also loses the 
small amount of capital of which he is possessed.301 
 
UNDER-CAPITALIZED COMPANIES: THE CADMAN 
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Late in January 1905, shareholders in the Cadman and Sceptre claims 
at Waiorongomai decided to combine these into a company with a capital of 
£12,500, in 100,000 shares of 2s 6d each.302 In April, the Cadman Company 
bought the Cadman and Sceptre special claims for £455 7s, an amount 
‘satisfied as to’ £325 by the nine vendors receiving 6,500 shares paid up to 
1s per share and the balance by the allotment of 16,250 shares paid up to 1 
5/7d.303 Seven vendors plus six new shareholders received 18,250 shares 
paid up to 1 5/7d; the agent and legal manager who arranged the purchase 
each received 1,000.304 The vendors comprised six Aucklanders (a brewer, a 
solicitor, a tailor, a builder, an agent, and a ‘gentleman’), two local miners, 
and a Stratford hotelkeeper. The other shareholders lived at Te Aroha and 
Auckland, and were a solicitor, a carpenter, a Catholic priest, a storeman, a 
farmer, and an accountant who was also the company secretary.   
Shares were 2s 6d each, initial payment being 1 5/7d, and the nominal 
capital of 100,000 shares theoretically provided £25,500. The prospectus, 
after stating that the ore ‘would run about 10dwt per ton’, declared that the 
vendors had ‘sufficient confidence in the property to consider that its future 
increased value, due to the proposed development expenditure’, would 
‘repay them for the loss of so large an interest’.305 On 29 May, the annual 
report announced that, including those issued partly paid up to the vendors, 
74,800 shares had been allotted, providing £357 10s. After various costs had 
been deducted, the largest being wages (£59 15s), £200 1s remained in 
hand.306 Less than three months later, the company applied to work the 
Cadman Special Quartz Claim of 30 acres for six months with two men 
instead of the required ten, and for a similar period for the remainder of its 
ground, pending the acquisition of more capital. These applications were 
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then withdrawn, and work ceased, ‘for want of funds’.307 In December, the 
secretary reported that, as it had ‘no funds to pay rent due on the 1st 
January 1906’, it could not ‘man the properties as required by law’.308 The 
following month, Thomas Gavin,309 one of the original vendors, successfully 
applied for the abandoned ground.310 
 
UNDER-CAPITALISED COMPANIES: THE SEDDON 
 
Adjoining the Cadman Company’s ground was that of the Seddon 
Company, registered in August 1909.311 When negotiations were underway 
to float this, ‘sufficient working capital’, £50,000, was sought. ‘A well known 
Auckland gentleman, with considerable influence in financial circles’, was 
to go to England to raise capital.312 No more was heard about this man and 
his mission, and, when registered two months later, the company’s capital 
was only £10,000, in 100,000 2s shares: £9,625-worth had been allotted.313 
In July 1909, it had received permission to work with four men for six 
months, and later applied for another six months’ protection.  By October 
1910, £700 had been spent prospecting and crosscutting. The managing 
director informed the warden that there was a ‘little gold in several of the 
big reefs’ but was ‘not sure’ any was payable until the ore was tested. 
‘Company has spent its capital. No money to go on with until we make a 
call’.314 Investors were not interested: during 1910, buyers either made no 
offers or offered only 1d a share, half what sellers wanted. Only briefly in 
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July were buyers willing to offer 1 1/2d, and by the end of August trading 
had ceased.315  
The yearly reports starkly revealed its struggles. To the end of 1909, 
£875 of the capital had been paid up and £432 spent;316 to the end of 1910, 
£882 had been spent but the amount paid up remained £875, equal to the 
call of 3d per share,317 and by the end of 1911, £1,237 had been spent, 
£1,257 had been paid up, and arrears of calls totalled £34.318 After the first 
treatment had revealed the value of the ore to be disappointing, all miners 
were dismissed at the end of 1911 and protection obtained until there was ‘a 
reasonable prospect’ of successful treatment.319 During its last year of 
operation 1912, little work was done, protection being granted once more.320 
£1,258 had been paid up, £1 more than the previous year, and arrears of 
calls was £34; £1,278 had been spent, and debts of £18 were owed, which 
meant that it had been working at a loss. There had been no income from 
selling bullion.321 The profit and loss account to 31 August 1910 also 
revealed that the £142 14s 2d cost of brokerage combined with the working 
expenses of the Auckland office, £223 16s 8d, were nearly as great as the 
working expenses of the mine, £411 10s 3d.322 Despite the financially 
straightened state of the company, only two calls were made: one of 3d, and 
the other, at the lowest possible rate of a farthing, in May 1913.323 
 
OVER-CAPITALIZED COMPANIES 
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Large nominal capital meant that over-capitalized mines were almost 
certainly doomed to failure, as explained in 1897: 
 
If on a capital of £30,000, £20,000 is for working purposes, a 
return may be looked for in most cases, because it is easy, after a 
certain amount of progress has been made, and the ground has 
been opened up, and its capabilities have been shown, to raise 
additional capital for machinery or any other purpose. But when 
£250,000 of capital has been heaped upon it at the start, while 
only £20,000 has been spent in working, it is impossible to do 
anything further, and the whole enterprise breaks down by sheer 
weight of dead capital.324 
  
Welton commented that, ‘owing to the magnitude of the nominal 
capital’ in many companies, it was frequently ‘impossible to pay a sufficient 
rate of dividend to make the shares of any value’.325 The Thames Advertiser 
agreed that over-capitalization was ‘a curse’, and had recently ‘retarded the 
development of the industry most markedly in Western Australia’. It cited 
the views of the Otago Daily Times about the flotation of a London company 
to work an Otago property: 
 
The vendors asked the British investor to give them £100,000 for 
a property for which only £5000 was given a few months before, 
and on which no work had been done in the interval, and they 
expect the public to believe that interest on the overwhelming 
capital of £150,000 can be provided by a working capital of 
£50,000.326 
 
The first issue of the New Zealand Mines Record cited this editorial 
and its explanation that ‘to return interest at even 6 per cent on this 
nominal capital’ would require ‘earning 18 per cent’, an ‘outrageous demand’ 
on the ore. The Mines Record was aware of ‘many instances of a similar 
kind, which have proved a great detriment to the mining industry’.327  
A London correspondent for the New Zealand Mining Standard was 
‘given to understand that New Zealanders have in many cases made grave 
errors in placing big prices upon their properties and demanding heavy 
capitalisation’, and cited a Coromandel syndicate demanding £175,000 to 
                                            
324 Editorial, Auckland Weekly News, 10 April 1897, p. 17.  
325 Welton, pp. 48, 76. 
326 Editorial, Thames Advertiser, 15 June 1897, p. 2. 
327 New Zealand Mines Record, 16 August 1897, pp. 24-25. 
73 
provide a working capital of £20,000.328 James McGowan, who was to 
become Minister of Mines in 1900, two years previously told the Auckland 
Chamber of Mines that it was not uncommon for mines to be floated in 
London with a capital of £200,000, ‘returning to the district supposed to 
produce profits on the whole of that sum something ranging from £25,000 
down to £12,000’. Because of this, ‘they need hardly expect companies to pay 
very large interests on the subscribed capital. No other industry that could 
be named had such a load to carry’. One of his listeners responded that this 
overloading was ‘far below the average in any other part of the world’, and 
that the problem ‘cured itself. In a time like this if a mine was over-
capitalised it was sure to go to the wall’.329 An English mining reporter, 
writing in 1897, who opposed over-capitalised companies, considered that a 
capital of £50,000, ‘with half set aside for working capital, might pay’.330 At 
Thames, the mines operated by ‘small local companies, economically 
handled ... paid their way, and occasionally, when they came upon a rich 
patch, a dividend. But now that so many of the more hopeful have been 
taken over by English syndicates with huge capitals, I cannot see how they 
will ever succeed’.331 In 1935 the Under-Secretary of Mines considered that 
‘excessive vendor consideration resulting in over-capitalisation and often at 
the same time an inadequacy of working capital’ was ‘probably the worst 
evil in the New Zealand mining industry outside of definite dishonesty’.332  
As mining property was ‘practically valueless’ until working capital 
was spent in its development, it was ‘generally overvalued for purposes of 
flotation’.333 Over-capitalisation combined with inadequate working capital 
often forced companies with a good mine into liquidation. Thereupon, the 
vendors, who had ‘stood on velvet with promoters’ shares or money received 
as vendors, snap up the whole concern for a mere song, thus reaping the 
benefit of the development done with the subscribed capital’.334 
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COSTLY BATTERIES 
 
Under-capitalized companies lived from hand to mouth, hoping to 
obtain good ore quickly to meet development costs that sometimes included 
erecting a treatment plant to avoid paying high charges to battery owners. 
Mining engineers noted the haste to erect plants needed to obtain returns 
meant that often a large amount of capital was wasted once it was 
discovered that the ore was worthless, and preferred capital to be spent on 
the mine, using profits made from selling ore to erect a plant.335 Developing 
the ore body and determining its value was the first priority, ‘as until this 
work has advanced to a considerable extent’ it was not ‘prudent to erect 
expensive machinery and buildings for treating the ore’.336 The cost of 
working the mine and battery did ‘not appear to occupy the minds of 
shareholders or directors of companies so much as the possibilities of 
improved machinery and processes whereby a greater percentage of 
extraction may be obtained; in other words, the practical is not infrequently 
neglected for the theoretical’.337 
Waiorongomai’s Arizona Company, which did not last long because of 
the paucity of good ore but which, typically, commenced with high hopes, 
planned to erect a battery, and retained half its shares for sale to meet the 
cost.338 One was not constructed, and instead all companies used Firth and 
Clark’s battery.339 The agreement to construct this required the Premier 
Company to transfer 2,000 paid up shares to the Battery Company, the New 
Find a 2,000, and the English Army 2,500, in return for ‘a prior right of ten 
heads each, and at a moderate cost of ten shillings per ton’. This 
arrangement was expected to meet much of the cost of erection, and 
although the terms were considered rather severe, the alternative was no 
plant.340  
Sometimes small companies erected batteries to obtain cheaper 
treatment. For instance, the Ferguson Smelting Company, which planned 
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to use Tui ore in their works at Waiomu, in 1909 ‘exhausted their capital in 
the erection of their plant’ and was ‘without funds to carry on operations’.341 
Larger companies wasted their more substantial capital by spending too 
much on batteries and too little on mines, a universal phenomenon. Curle 
warned against ‘the premature erection of a battery and other needless 
machinery’.342  
Concerning Hauraki mining generally, Warden Northcroft in 1898 
criticised foreign investors for failing to develop their mines adequately 
before building expensive and unnecessary plant. Once capital was 
‘absorbed in building tramways and batteries’, shareholders refused ‘to 
advance any more money on such an apparently barren venture’, and the 
plant was sold for ‘a song’.343 Before the 1890s boom, which saw many 
batteries erected, McCombie argued that ‘fully fifty per cent’ of expenditure 
on mining was ‘wasted, partly through ignorance and want of organisation, 
but chiefly because none of the persons interested will take a common sense 
view of the industry’ instead seeing it as a way to make through the share 
trading. This attitude was typified by inadequate mine development and 
erecting often unsuitable ‘milling machinery on the most elaborate and 
costly scale’.  
 
By the time the plant is in complete working order there is no 
capital available to open up the mine, and as the ore will not of its 
own accord leave the bowels of Mother Earth and run into the 
mill hoppers, the whole thing is pronounced a “duffer,” and 
liquidation ensues. Briefly, this is the history of a whole legion of 
mining ventures throughout the colony wherever I have been, and 
from time to time I have visited nearly every known mining 
centre.344 
 
For instance, the Te Aroha Silver and Gold Mining Company345 erected 
a large plant before confirming the extent and quality of the ore. Such 
companies spent ‘the whole of the available capital on the erection of 
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elaborate machinery’ and started ‘to look for ore with an empty exchequer 
afterwards’.346 He again referred to this waste of capital in 1902: 
 
Scattered broadcast over our goldfields to-day are innumerable 
monuments of the ignorance and recklessness of the men who 
controlled a number of our mining propositions. These 
monuments take the shape of batteries, shaft equipment, and all 
round mining operations, costing in the aggregate hundreds of 
thousands of pounds sterling. 
 
Whilst some capital had been spent in ‘a spirit of sheer cussedness’, 
some was spent because of ‘the grasping greed of directors and shareholders’ 
and their ‘inordinate desire to accumulate filthy lucre’: 
 
Trusting to scrip market fluctuations to see them out on the right 
side of the ledger, they embark their capital in all sorts of wild 
schemes. By way of illustration: We will suppose the Wheel of 
Fortune G. M. Co. has just located upon an auriferous section of 
country and that the surface indications are favorable. The next 
form of procedure, in order to get a market value on the shares, is 
for the owners to ignore the want of development on the mine, 
and to devote all their capital and energy to the erection of 
milling machinery on the most costly and elaborate scale; utterly 
regardless of its suitability or otherwise for their requirements. 
When the plant is ready for work there is no capital available to 
open up the mine.347 
 
Near the end of his life, McCombie again condemned the ‘mining 
monuments’ littering New Zealand that were still being erected because all 
the capital went into the plant and not the mine.348 In 1935, the Under-
Secretary of Mines wrote that directors preferred to spend capital not on 
‘proper prospecting’ but on ‘purchasing plant and erecting structures which 
can be seen by the shareholders as tangible evidence that they are getting a 
run for their money’, thereby exhausting the working capital.349 Thirteen 
years later, a Mines Department engineer regretted that ‘money spent in 
trying to solve treatment problems and obtain finance from London’ had not 
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been spent ‘on prospecting and developing’, which would have provided 
‘some worthwhile information’ about the lodes.350  
Some suspected ulterior motives in the way capital was spent. For 
instance, a manager of copper mining companies at Great Barrier Island in 
the 1860s later wrote that one company’s inadequate capital was  
 
to a very great extent absorbed in the original purchase of the 
land … and in the cost of too elaborate and expensive sawmill and 
mining plants, which had been sent out from England. So much 
was this the case that I have sometimes wondered whether the 
promoters of similar Companies are not often interested in the 
sale of such machinery and plant. I suspect it was so in the cases 
of the Companies I represented.351  
 
ONLY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF NOMINAL CAPITAL PAID UP 
 
A typical company made as few demands upon its shareholders as 
possible. Only small amounts were paid upon application and allotment, 
and shareholders were assured that calls would be kept to a minimum. For 
instance, at Te Aroha, as noted the All Nations Company required payment 
of 3d on application and 3d on allotment, potential investors being assured 
that calls would not exceed 3d per month.352 The meeting that formed a 
company to work the Te Aroha No. 2 South claim in December 1880 agreed 
that no single call was to exceed 6d per share.353 When a Te Aroha 
Prospecting Association was formed in 1887, shareholders paid 1d on 
application, 2d upon allotment, and the ‘balance if required, by calls not to 
exceed one penny per share per month’.354  
Another example was the Premier Company, registered in March 1882 
with a capital of £20,000, in £1 shares.355 Although 19 months later only 9d 
per share had been paid up, such was the ‘rich appearance’ of the ore 
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awaiting treatment when the battery started and the ‘very favourable 
result’ anticipated that they were worth 15s.356 A month later, a Te Aroha 
correspondent asked ‘Who has not heard of the Premier, in which shares are 
held in every, and the remotest parts of New Zealand? Only this afternoon 
enquiries reached us by wire from shareholders in Christchurch in reference 
to the prospects of the claim’. He noted that, ‘after a struggling existence of 
two years, during which time the shareholders have only been called upon 
to pay 9d per 20s scrip, the claim stands to-day almost free from any 
liabilities’.357 The directors had to report in May 1884 that the results of the 
crushings were such that mining ‘so far has not been attended with any 
approach to that success which was so generally anticipated’. Receipts for 
the year were £2,315 11s 11d, expenditure was £2,275 12s, and assets, 
exclusive of the uncalled capital, were in excess of the liabilities by only £49 
0s 10d.358 In October 1885, a special meeting was held to consider whether 
to go into liquidation or to make calls to meet liabilities of about £250 and 
resume working. It was unanimously agreed to make the calls.359 Only one 
call had been made earlier, of 3d per share in March 1884;360 the one after 
the 1885 meeting was for 6d.361 As this was insufficient to meet expenses 
and to overcome the lack of rich ore, in 1886 tenders were invited to 
purchase the property.362 After none were received, a private sale was made 
to an Auckland engineer, George Fraser,363 who paid a mere £150, and the 
company was wound up.364 During its existence only £3,260 had been paid 
up, a sum that included promoters’ shares, and £1,260 had been received 
from calls.365 
When shares were first allotted, it was normal practice to retain a 
large parcel in trust for the company, to be sold as needed to finance 
development. For instance, when shareholders in the Te Aroha No. 2 South 
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claim agreed to form a company, they decided that, of its 8,000 shares, 
3,000 would be retained for issuing later.366 All companies gazetted during 
1882 had shares held in trust. Seven of the 20 had a quarter of their shares 
held in this way,367 three had a fifth,368 one had 6,000 of the usual 20,000 
issued,369 and others had varying but lesser amounts.370 The Last Find 
Company, formed in September 1883, allotted 9,000 of its 15,000 shares to 
shareholders; half the remainder were retained by the company, the other 
half being sold immediately.371 This sale made it unnecessary during its 
brief life to make any calls.372 The Chance Company, registered in the same 
month, reserved 5,000 of its 20,000 and sold 3,000 of these immediately for 
2s each, the £300 thus gained being spent working the ground.373 Eight 
months later, the remaining shares were offered to shareholders.374 As this 
raised insufficient capital, two months later the first call, of 1d, was 
made.375 The fact that in the following month the company was ordered to 
pay £15 arrears in rent indicated either that it could not sell a sufficient 
number of shares or that its shareholders were reluctant to pay calls.376 
Early in 1885, it forfeited its claim.377  
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At the end of March 1885, there were 17 companies registered at 
Waiorongomai, with a nominal capital of £345,000, but of this amount only 
£14,000 had been paid up.378  
 
CALLS 
 
To turn to a company with better prospects, and most unusual 
amongst Waiorongomai companies in issuing a 6d dividend in 1884,379 the 
Colonist Company had the usual amount of nominal capital at that time, 
£20,000. By August 1888, although the capital subscribed was £19,912, the 
amount actually paid in cash was only £1,112 0s 3d. Calls of 1s 3d had been 
levied; as calls on 7,337 shares had not been paid, they were forfeited and 
sold for £127 2s 7d.380 Another 60 forfeited shares had been sold by late 
January the following year, producing another £8.381 Such sales were 
normal, but only provided income if the mine was in favour with the public. 
Extracting calls from shareholders were always difficult whenever the mine 
appeared to be failing. In the case of this mine, at the start of 1885 the 
company announced that all work would be done on contact, ‘wherever 
practicable’,382 in an attempt to cut costs. In February, the mine was closed 
because ‘the continued drain upon the company’s resources through 
excessive crushing charges’ had ‘so impoverished the exchequer’ that there 
were no funds ‘to carry on during a period of depression like the present’.383 
Later that month, a bankrupt whose estate included 700 shares in this 
company, ‘worth about £175’, but these could not be sold because there was 
‘no market at present’.384 A call of 6d had to be made.385 The warden 
granted protection after being told that it was not  
 
expedient to continue working the mine on the mere chance of 
getting sufficient gold to pay for labour, and that a call has been 
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made, and until it is collected (which will probably be in not less 
than three months, the period for which protection is required) 
there would be no funds in hand to meet the cost of working.386  
 
That shareholders were extremely reluctant to contribute more money 
to a company that appeared to be failing was shown when, on 1 August, a 
list of 27 shareholders was published along with the warning that, should 
they not pay their calls, their shares would be forfeited.387 In June, the mine 
was let for a period on tribute to the Battery Company, who would take out 
300 trucks at a fixed rate, the balance after all charges was paid going to 
the company.388 This arrangement ‘aroused considerable disgust amongst 
shareholders’, but a correspondent argued that the arrangement was ‘the 
very best course that could be adopted under the circumstances’. 
Shareholders were relieved  ‘of the responsibility of wages etc’, and as the 
mine was ‘heavily indebted’ and shareholders were ‘unwilling to pay the 
last call of sixpence per share, the directors were compelled to adopt some 
means to enable them to hold the ground’ and ‘relieve the mine of its 
financial liabilities’.389 Another correspondent argued that, as the terms 
made ‘the interests of the shareholders altogether secondary to those of the 
Battery Company’, it was ‘not surprising that those persons who have held 
onto their shares, in the hope that they might ultimately become of some 
value, should object to their property thus loosely dealt with’.390  
Because of the costs of extracting, transporting, and treating ore of low 
quality, it was considered that the mine might have to close,391 and an 
extraordinary general meeting held in February 1887 agreed to its sale.392 
As it was not sold, in the following April another call, of 3d, was made.393 As 
that coincided with a discovery of better ore, there was  
 
a demand for shares, many people during the week have been 
asked “have you any Colonists?,” an interrogation that has not 
been put for a length of time before. Holders however, having 
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stuck to their scrip so far, did not appear to care to part with 
them, but prefer awaiting further developments.394  
 
There continued to be interest in purchasing shares throughout 
1888.395 There was less interest in paying calls, and one of 3d made in July 
was followed by the sale in December of 500 forfeited shares.396 Another 
call, of 1d, was made in the following April,397 and in May the annual 
general meeting was told that, whilst ‘there had been a considerable 
improvement in the mine, and the prospects of the Company were very 
favourable’, its finances were still very insecure. Receipts for the past 12 
months had been £668 3s 2d, while expenditure had been £656 7s 11d. 
Assets, excluding 150 tons at grass awaiting treatment, amounted to £57 
11s 8d, and liabilities were £44 7s 8d.398 Five months later, a call of 1 1/2d 
was made,399 the last time any report was published about this company. 
Being asked to pay calls when a company was in difficulty encouraged 
dummyism,400 and in no liability companies shareholders simply abandoned 
their interests. If a large number of calls were unpaid, companies could not 
function, as was shown on many goldfields. After the first boom at Thames, 
when calls ‘became far more frequent than dividends’, shareholders ‘eagerly’ 
sought ‘any pretext for evading payment’, the consequence being ‘stagnation 
of trade, and depression on the goldfield’.401 McCombie, referring in 1888 to 
mining at Karangahake, wrote that it appeared  
 
that the capital of the companies owning property has existed 
only on paper, and every attempt made to levy contributions in 
the shape of calls upon the shareholders met with anything but 
favourable responses, and the work of developing the mines 
languished until it is now almost snuffed out in consequence’402 
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In 1876 the warden told a shareholder who was not paying calls in a 
Tairua claim ‘that by accepting shares in the company he had accepted a 
liability of £500 (he had 500 shares). He knew he had not the money to meet 
this liability, and it was a fraud upon his butcher and baker to have 
accepted them. It was men such as he who were the means of locking up the 
goldfield’.403  
In 1891, ‘every one, especially those who are interested in goldmining, 
seems to have a “holy horror” of calls’.404 The Thames Advertiser commented 
that ‘few, when they think they are getting into a good thing, take the 
liability into account. They are more inclined to count the profits which they 
expect to derive from the sale of those shares’.405 ‘Obadiah’ was puzzled ‘how 
readily timid shareholders will forfeit scrip for which they paid shillings a 
year ago rather than pay a penny or half-penny call’.406 
At Waiorongomai, failure to pay calls handicapped all the companies. 
The Hero Company, for example, required several calls, of small sums, 
shareholders having agreed at its inaugural meeting in May 1882 that no 
call would exceed 6d.407 There were 15,000 £1 shares, all subscribed apart 
from the 3,000 held in trust for the company; when established there were 
eight shareholders in both Auckland and Te Aroha, two at Paeroa and one 
at Thames, but by December shares were ‘held almost entirely by Auckland 
people’.408 Finance was always tight, and the first of several calls of 3d was 
made in July 1882.409 Some vendors and shareholders were unbusinesslike, 
and in December plaints had to be laid against some shareholders of the 
original claim to acquire their interests for the company.410 In the following 
February 1883, the legal manager, Roderick McDonald Scott,411 explained 
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to George Wilson, the mining inspector,412 that the rent had not been paid 
because ‘certain shareholders refusing to sign the Transfer of their interests 
to the Company’. The Hero was one of John Calder’s ‘bungles and it has 
given me nothing but trouble’.413 Calder, the original owner of the claim and 
a speculator in mining there,414 was an artist.415 Scott intended to ‘have a 
satisfactory termination – at any rate I want my part to be correct’. He 
asked for ‘the necessary time to have a call made to square my advances on 
the company’s account – and to have everything paid’.416 The rent was not 
paid until the beginning of April, ‘thro’ no fault of mine’, and Wilson was 
thanked ‘for taking no steps in absence of the payment’. When more 
interests were transferred to the company its title would be complete ‘and 
all blame removed from my shoulders’. Scott hoped that Wilson would not 
require him to man the ground until the battery operated ‘and to give me 
time to recover the money advanced by me to the Company’. He sent his 
own cheque as he found ‘it difficult to get people at Te Aroha to attend to 
business’.417  
In late July, Scott again wrote to Wilson: 
 
The forfeited Shares of the Company surrendered and now sold 
having put the Company in funds I am calling a meeting of 
Directors for Tuesday next when it is presumed orders will be 
given to start work –  
Now that matters are more bright with the Company I have no 
doubt that those shareholders who would not pay a call nor listen 
to any warning from me will consider themselves much injured 
people – and that I ought to have paid their calls and saved them 
being forfeited.  
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I hope now to see the claim worked and the company prosper.418 
 
Shortly afterwards, all 5,170 forfeited shares having been sold, the 
company was ‘in good funds’.419 In December a fourth call was made, and in 
March 1884 a fifth.420 This came after a meeting between the directors and 
‘the inspector of the company’s claim’: 
 
The works proposed at the latter were discussed in conjunction 
with the return from the trial crushing of 20 tons of quartz, which 
yielded 8oz 2dwt melted gold, and sold at £2 18s per ounce. It was 
decided that there was sufficient encouragement to put in a low 
level, to give 130 feet of backs, and to connect the same with the 
tramway line by trestles and truck-line; also to sink a winze on 
the lode to connect the intermediate and surface levels. Two feet 
of the hangingwall only of the lode was stripped and crushed, but 
a cross-cut will be put right through it to ascertain its width 
properly and give the claim a fair trial, the directors having 
confidence that further developments will prove the mine to turn 
out payable.421 
 
Two months later, shareholders were told that receipts for the past 12 
months ‘from proceeds of sale of surrendered shares, calls, and gold’ had 
produced £409 9s 8d. As expenditure was £382 15s 1d, the directors would 
‘stop operations for a time, to enable calls to be received and funds to be in 
hand’.422 A sixth and last call was made in August; failure to find payable 
ore meant a meeting was held in January 1884 to wind up the company.423 
The May Queen Company, to take another example, had continual 
difficulties because of reluctance to pay calls. Formed in October 1883,424 it 
started ‘considerably in debt on account of prospecting operations and the 
expenses incurred in the formation of the company’, requiring an immediate 
call of 2d.425 In the following February, 14 names were published of those 
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whose shares would be forfeited unless the call was paid.426 A month later, 
7,050 or possibly even more of these shares were sold. Although the 
attendance ‘was small, and the bidding very tardy’, all were sold, at from 2d 
per share for larger lots to 3 1/4d for smaller lots.427 At the end of May, a 1d 
call was made, 17 shareholders were warned their shares could be forfeited, 
and 1,000 shares were forfeited and sold.428 This call and later sale, coupled 
with extracting better ore, meant that further development was possible, 
with £30 left unspent at the time of the annual meeting in November.429 In 
August, 5,000 shares held in trust were sold to shareholders for 2s 6d 
deposit per share.430  
By March 1885, a 2d call was needed, and in June 13 people were 
listed as being liable to forfeit their shares for non-payment.431 That month, 
a correspondent regretted that the shareholders of ‘this excellent mine’ were 
‘so remiss’ in paying calls, for ‘want of funds’ meant it could not be ‘opened 
up in a systematic manner’ and provide returns. The present mode of 
working would ‘exhaust the ground’ partially opened up ‘and place the 
company in a worse position’.432 Gold obtained had paid for all the working 
expenses for the past year and the company had been able to drive 150 feet 
in the low level, but late that month operations were suspended because 
some shareholders had not paid calls.433 The financial situation led to ‘a fair 
attendance’ at an extraordinary general meeting at the beginning of 
December.434 The chairman reported that ‘the directors had passed a 
resolution in favour of winding up the company, in consequence of the 
difficulty experienced in getting in calls’. By a majority vote, it was decided 
to continue work, and shareholders were given the opportunity of 
purchasing the 5,000 reserved shares in proportion to the shares currently 
held. After the meeting, the directors made a call of 1d, sufficient ‘to pay off 
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all liabilities and put in the low level besides leaving a balance in hand’.435 
Most forfeited shares had been applied for, which would assist in financing 
renewed mining.436 Another call was required in May 1886, again for 1d.437 
By January 1887, operations had ceased.438 An extraordinary general 
meeting held at the start of the following month decided that, ‘as the 
company’s financial position did not permit of operations being resumed, 
and it not being deemed advisable to pay calls, the company be wound 
up’.439 
The smaller the company, and the worse the ore, the more difficult it 
was to get shareholders to pay calls. This was illustrated by the 
Waitawheta Prospecting Company, which mostly reworked old ground at 
Waiorongomai from 1907 onwards. Formed with a capital of £7,250, by the 
end of 1912 £5,660 was paid up and £59 in calls was owing. £5,763 had been 
spent, debts amounting to £424 were unpaid, and although 119 ounces of 
bullion had been produced, this was unsold.440 To encourage the 157 
shareholders to meet their obligations, the directors assured them that their 
policy was that they ‘should have a reasonable time to pay their Calls’ and 
that every call was ‘fully justified, and the moneys carefully and wisely 
spent’.441 At a shareholders’ meeting in May 1914, the directors 
recommended that, as all the capital had been called up, the company be re-
formed as the Waitawheta Gold Mining Company. This was agreed to, and 
share for share was offered to shareholders of the existing company, the 2s 
shares being treated as half paid up and shareholders paying 1/2d on 
application and the same on allotment. Of the 200,000 shares, 145,000 were 
distributed in this way, the remainder being held in reserve.442 The 
following year the secretary of both the old and new companies complained 
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that thousands of pounds had been spent during the past three years ‘with 
most discouraging results, so discouraging that of the last Call, 48,000 
shares were forfeited out of a total of 145,000’.443  
The new company commenced with 113 shareholders, for not all the 
earlier shareholders ‘took up the Shares to which they were entitled, and 
this considerably reduced the amount of working Capital expected by your 
Directors’.444 Of the £9,698 subscribed, £4,849 had been distributed as scrip 
to shareholders in the earlier company, and cash received amounted to only 
£363. At the end of 1914, arrears of calls were £41.445 Only a few weeks 
after being formed, the First World War broke out, and the capital ‘so much 
required’ was ‘not paid as promptly as desired. This necessitated the Board 
taking a conservative course of action’, meaning that the mine remained 
closed, with the manager retained as caretaker. Attempting to meet the 
liabilities inherited from the old company combined with the payment of 
rents were ‘a drag on our resources’. By January 1915, as the directors did 
not consider that mining could restart until after the war, they did not 
intend to call up further capital.446 In mid-1915, the secretary stated that, 
after erecting a new battery, improving the water race, and developing the 
mine, all the capital of both companies had been used up, for ‘very little 
gold’, indeed ‘not half enough to pay expenses’. This was ‘the worst time’ for 
32 years: ‘nothing like it since 1879’, with shares on all goldfields ‘being 
forfeited in all directions’.447 The warden commented that the company had 
‘come to the end of their present resources’ and could not obtain funds for 
more ‘experimental mining’.448  
In October 1916, the directors reported that, while ‘a small income 
from the sale of water power and the renting of our Rockbreaker’ had 
enabled them ‘to carry on without recourse to Shareholders’, it was now 
necessary to make a 1/2d call ‘to carry on till the end of the war’. They 
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considered shareholders ‘would be wise in making an effort at this critical 
time to retain their property’.449 This call produced £48 0s 6 1/2d.450 In 
March 1917, the directors informed shareholders that, as they had ‘no 
available money to pay for current expenses and outstanding Liabilities’, it 
was ‘necessary to make a call to tide over affairs till the conclusion of the 
War’.451 This call of 1/2d produced a mere £26 19s 7 1/2d.452 The directors 
described this as ‘a very poor response, 55 shareholders only having paid’.453 
By the end of 1917, when the nominal capital was £10,156, only £458 had 
been paid up, the number of shareholders had fallen to 57, and arrears of 
calls amounted to £148. As there had been no output and only one man was 
employed, at prospecting,454 it is clear why shareholdings had declined and 
remaining shareholders were reluctant to contribute further funds. In 
December, as explained by the directors, there being ‘no possible hope of 
ever being able to start working again, and a good opportunity having 
occurred of selling the assets’, these were sold for £250. This amount did not 
cover the company’s indebtedness, but creditors were asked to accept it.455 
When in 1918 the company was wound up, the liquidator had an easy task, 
for there were ‘no assets, they having been already disposed of, so there was 
nothing to wind up’.456 
A humourist who visited the early Thames goldfield wrote that calls 
were ‘terrible things’, being ‘more expensive than a new baby’, and coming 
‘far more frequently’. Dividends by comparison was ‘a thing we read about, 
but seldom experience’, for he estimated the average to be ‘one dividend of 
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sixpence a share and nine calls of a shilling’.457 Nevertheless, many 
shareholders retained their interests despite the dangers of being required 
to pay calls, hoping to sell them at a profit either because of good ore being 
found in their mines or neighbouring ones. For instance, when a find was 
made in the Premier that was allegedly as good as the Martha lode, shares 
in surrounding properties ‘hardened in sympathy’.458 It was commonly 
argued that shares were ‘largely looked upon as gambling counters, the 
development of a mine on business lines for dividends to repay investors 
being far too slow a process’ to suit many investors.459  
In 1897, the New Zealand Graphic noted that calls pressed ‘heavily on 
those persons who tried to hold too much scrip. As the bulk of the new 
companies were formed under the no-liability section of the Act, many 
shares are being forfeited, and as these have to be sold at auction, the prices 
paid are often ridiculously small’. The Chamber of Mines wanted to 
government ‘to protect shareholders who duly pay their calls, as there is a 
growing tendency to forfeit shares, and then buy them back for less money 
than the call amounted to. Of course this can only be done with low-priced 
stocks for which there are no buyers at any price, and does not affect shares 
in proved mines’.460 Without waiting for government action, ‘many 
companies’ decided ‘not to allow shares upon which calls have not been paid, 
to be sold for ridiculously low figures at auction. In some cases these 
forfeited shares have been sold as low as 3s per thousand, which simply 
means that the purchaser’ could ‘always undersell those who paid their 
calls. In future these shares will be bought in by the directors of the 
companies, and held in trust for existing shareholders’.461 
 
VENDORS AND PROMOTERS PROFIT 
 
Welton stated that the main cause of failures was ‘the payment of 
excessive commissions to promoters’, and owners got little from their 
properties ‘beyond some fully-paid shares which may never be of value’.462 
These high commissions were ‘a tax upon the discoverer of a property and 
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upon the public, without any compensating quality’.463 ‘The price to be paid 
the vendor and the manner of making the payment’ were ‘of very great 
importance’ for the ultimate success of companies, ‘keeping in view the 
mutual interests of the vendor and purchaser, as the vendor upon selling 
his property becomes a partner with the purchaser’. The best dividend-
paying companies had bought their property ‘for comparatively small sums’, 
whereas many non-dividend paying ones had paid ‘large amounts’. It was 
reasonable for the vendor’s price to be ‘considerable’ when the mines had 
been opened up or profitably worked, for there was ‘comparatively little risk 
to the purchaser’. Most companies were formed to work ‘prospects’, which 
should be acquired for the cost of the title ‘plus a commission; any higher 
value must depend on the actual discovery’ of reefs ‘of some value’. Claim 
owners would develop the ore bodies before selling their properties, if they 
had faith in them, to increase their value ‘greatly’. The amount paid for a 
claim ‘should increase in proportion to the development done, and 
consequently, the diminished risk which the purchaser may run’. Claim 
owners unable to develop their properties ‘must be content with a small 
price’.464  
 
As to the payment to the vendor. Many methods have been 
adopted, such as giving founders’ shares, only entitled to 
dividends after a fixed dividend has been paid on the ordinary 
shares; by deferred shares with similar conditions, by cash and 
shares, ordinary or deferred; and by ordinary shares with or 
without certain conditions as to sale. It is questionable if any 
advantage may arise from the above combinations, as the more 
difficult the payment to the vendor is made, the greater will be 
the number of shares required to satisfy him, and consequently, 
the greater the nominal capital upon which to pay dividends, as 
the deferred shares frequently become ordinary ones after certain 
dividends have been paid. If the property purchased is of any real 
value, there can be no objection to paying cash for it, the more so 
that very possibly a very much less amount would be accepted, 
the nominal capital of the company would be reduced, and the 
shares would be of much more value. The difficulties placed in the 
way of the vendor receiving payment appear to arise from distrust 
of the property being of value, but it is hard to see to what extent 
the acceptance of such terms as are frequently made guarantees 
the value of the property, and if the purchaser has the property 
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examined by a competent person before concluding to receive it, 
he should know quite as much of it as the vendor himself.465 
 
He warned that unless a vendor sought payment in a way that 
permitted to capital to be ‘adjusted on a reasonable basis to make profits’, 
there was no point in forming a company to work his property. He cited 
another engineer’s axioms: ‘They who take the risk and entitled to the 
profits of success’, and ‘Where nothing has been discovered that can be 
profitably worked, there is nothing to pay for’. This engineer considered that 
‘the original discoverer should be remunerated for his trouble, intelligence, 
and expense’ by being paid ‘double the actual cost incurred, and get a 
similar amounts in the proposed company, but should not be allowed to 
throw these shares on the market, except by special arrangement, until the 
mine pays its cost’.466  
Explaining the ‘ambitiously high level of capitalization’ of non-mining 
companies floated in Auckland in the 1880s, Russell Stone argued that 
almost always when promoters ‘sold the assets of an existing concern’ the 
capital authorised was ‘far in excess of the actual immediate value of the 
assets’, and based ‘not on earning capacity at the time of sale but on an 
optimistic estimate of future prospects’. Whilst willing to see an element of 
‘self-deception inseparable from speculative booms’, he discerned ‘a self-
regarding motive on the part of the vendors’: 
 
Promoters were well aware that only when there was a large 
issue authorized could the new company be heavily “loaded” with 
vendors’ shares and yet allow sufficient contributing shares to 
furnish the working capital to enable the company to become a 
going concern that would pay dividends and thereby permit the 
profitable off-loading of vendors’ shares at a later date.467 
 
In mining companies, vendors normally profited by retaining too large 
an interest. ‘Obadiah’ was angered in 1897 by the vendors of the Barrier 
Reefs Company, on Great Barrier Island, keeping four-fifths of the capital 
for themselves for potentially vast profit. The other fifth, subscribed by the 
public, had to meet the cost of developing the mine and erecting a 
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battery.468 Also in that year, the Thames Advertiser noted as highly unusual 
the vendors of the Royal Standard at Wharekiraupunga not asking the 
London promoters for any cash. This was ‘a strong proof of their confidence 
in their own mine’.469 Writing in 1899 about the many bubble companies 
then being liquidated, one Auckland newspaper stated that these had, ‘as a 
rule, from £500 to £1,500 of actual capital’. Shares given away to prominent 
men as ‘a sort of bait for a too gullible public’ were ‘counted as capital’.470 
Whilst the giving of free shares as bait cannot be proved to have occurred in 
the case of locally-floated Te Aroha companies, shares given to vendors that 
were fully or partly paid up were indeed included as part of the capital. As 
well, it was common practice to give the vendors an excessive amount of 
interest, especially in overseas companies. The Inspecting Engineer of the 
Mines Department considered that when a third or a half of the shares were 
given to promoters it would ‘take a very rich mine to pay fair interest on the 
nominal capital of such a company’. Giving away a large number of paid-up 
shares led to those who acquired them trying the raise share prices ‘by 
merely making representations as to the ultimate value of the mine, and by 
this means dispose of their interest above its real value’.471 Richard John 
Seddon, when visiting Waiorongomai as Minister of Mines in 1891, said 
capital should be spent working the mines, with preferential shares ‘only a 
second charge’.472 A London commentator, writing in 1902, warned 
potential shareholders not to ‘favourably consider a scheme in which the 
vendors propose to annex 60 or 80 per cent of the shares. As a rule, the 
unproved ground … usually floated as a mine has only cost the vendors the 
price of pegging out and surveying, or at most £1,000’.473 A New Zealand 
mining journal recommended that the public should acquire only 
contributing shares, not vendors’ shares, thus forcing the vendors to retain 
their paid-up shares until the value of the property was revealed.474  
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None of the vendors in the Te Aroha district sought such a large 
interest as in the Barrier Reefs example. Those forming companies in the 
early 1880s usually simply transferred their interests into scrip shares in 
proportion to the original holding,475 for they were not selling to another 
company but forming their own. Some vendors and promoters obtained half 
the shares when selling to larger concerns. For instance, the Te Aroha 
Silver and Gold Mining Company that took over most of Waiorongomai in 
1888 had a nominal capital of £200,000, half of which went to the 
promoters, only £21,000 being allocated to work the mines.476 During the 
1880s it was common practice for Auckland speculators to hold a large 
percentage of the nominal capital as vendors’ or promoters’ shares, relying 
on the contributing shares subscribed by the public to provide working 
capital. As vendors’ shares were treated as fully paid up, although the 
holders either paid only a fraction of their value or received them at no cost, 
they were not liable for calls and provided an easy profit when sold.477  
To stop too much capital enriching company promoters, the Thames 
Star wanted a stipulated proportion of the capital spent on testing the 
property.478 In 1891, ‘Obadiah’ wrote that ‘great harm has been done to our 
mining interests by the promoters collaring so much cash and spending so 
little on the mines’.479 Six years later, when the mining boom of the 1890s 
was fading, he noted that the vendors of one Hauraki venture had received 
50,000 shares along with £700 in cash. ‘After paying brokerage and other 
formation expenses, there was not a great deal left out of the original 
£1,200’ and no funds to work the ground, resulting in the company being 
wound up. ‘It would be interesting to know how many companies’ were ‘in a 
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similar position’.480 It was commonly agreed that the companies floated in 
the 1890s boom provided more money for speculators than for miners. For 
instance, one company secretary stated that many were ‘under capitalised, 
too much being absorbed in “floating” and “making a market” ’.481 Although 
about £1,000 may have been raised to develop each claim, only about £300 
of this went on working the mine ‘and the remainder has gone in “boom” 
’.482 The Mercantile and Bankruptcy Gazette of New Zealand in 1895 
recommended that, within 14 days of the formation of a company, it should 
be forced to disclose ‘the number of shares subscribed, differentiating 
between those allotted to vendors, their wives and relations, and bona fide 
purchasers’.483 Reportedly some holders of promoters’ shares sold them ‘as 
so much scrip, directly after the meeting forming the company and before 
the legal formalities’ had been complied with.484 To prevent the fleecing of 
shareholders, the Waikato Times argued that ‘the promoter should not 
receive any cash payment, but, as a guarantee of their good faith, should 
show themselves satisfied with paid-up shares’ which could not be sold ‘till 
the full amount of the nominal capital has been paid up’. The Brokers’ 
Association should copy the London Stock Exchange by satisfying 
themselves ‘of the genuineness of every claim before allowing the shares to 
be quoted on the official list’. Indeed, they should check to ensure that the 
claim ‘really exists, has shown indications of gold, or is in close proximity to 
land which has’.485  
In the Te Aroha Mining District, examples have been given in other 
chapters of how vendors, whether miners or speculators or local syndicates, 
attempted to profit from floating a company. Many other instances can be 
given. In an example of an unsuccessful attempt to sell a mine, two Te 
Aroha residents, Alexander Watson Edwards, a draper,486 and Peter Baine, 
a timber merchant,487 who were only involved with mining during the 1890s 
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boom,488 unsuccessfully attempted to sell three claims in Sydney in 1910.489 
Their ‘absolutely unworkable’ terms, in the view of a promoter they were 
dealing with, were £1,000 in cash and 30 per cent of the shares in the 
company. This proportion was ‘far above the usual thing, and even at 15% 
considerable difficulty would be experienced in getting the Public to 
subscribe’.490 When the shareholders in the Morning Star met in December 
1880 to form a company with the same name, they allotted themselves half 
the 12,000 shares. From the proceeds of selling shares to the public at 3s 
each, £450 was allocated to working the mine.491 In November 1896, 
shareholders in the Merchant of Venice Company, which had a nominal 
capital of only £6,000,492 and owned 200 acres near Te Aroha, ‘stopped the 
sale of shares pending the result of negotiations for the sale of the property 
to an English syndicate’.493 Whilst negotiations proceeded, only three men 
were employed, only £117 10s was spent, and no bullion was produced.494 
The New Zealand Mines Trust Company, a London firm, did take up an 
option, which, if it led to the formation of a company, would have given the 
vendors £40,000 in paid up shares out of the nominal capital of £150,000. 
Once again, the working capital of £30,000 would be less than the vendors 
would receive.495 In February the following year, when another British 
company was to take an option over the ground, it was anticipated that a 
company with a capital of £100,000 would be formed, of which the 
shareholders in the existing company would receive a fifth in paid up 
shares.496  
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James Mills, a carpenter who would be the first mayor of Te Aroha,497 
was an example of a vendor seeking too much. In February 1895 he chaired 
a meeting that established the Cadman Prospecting Association, and 
became its chairman.498 At this ‘enthusiastic meeting’ 25 residents signed 
up as members, ‘but treble that number could have been obtained, in fact a 
number of persons were disappointed in being too late in applying for 
shares’. A committee supervised prospecting by two men.499 In June, Mills 
applied for the Cadman Licensed Holding, 30 acres of abandoned workings 
in the former Werahiko, Silver King, Waitoki, and Success claims, which 
the association had been prospecting since its formation.500 This was 
granted, and taken up on 20 September. Nine days later, Mills applied for 
six months’ protection, as ‘property in hands of agent for sale in England’.501 
Included in this planned sale was the adjacent Seddon claim, making a total 
of 80 acres held by the association, along with a machine site, both acquired 
in October.502 Permission was gained to construct a water race from the 
Wairere Falls near Matamata.503 Rumours of the proposed sale meant that 
shares changed hands at from £30 to £40 each.504 
The price being asked was not revealed, but from what the solicitor 
acting on Mills’ behalf, James Russell, wrote, it was an optimistic amount. 
When sending Henry Reynolds,505 his agent in London,506 a ‘letter of option’ 
offering him the claims ‘for a fixed sum of money’, Russell anticipated that 
there might be ‘some difficulty’ because there was ‘no mention made of any 
shares in it, for the very simple reason’ that Mills got cash not shares. He 
                                            
497 See paper on his life. 
498 Te Aroha News, 20 February 1895, p. 2, 29 June 1895, p. 2; Mines Department, MD 1, 
97/1072, ANZ-W. 
499 Te Aroha News, 20 February 1895, p. 2. 
500 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1895, 20, 74/1895, BBAV 11582/4a, 
ANZ-A; Te Aroha News, 6 July 1895, p. 2. 
501 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1895, 74/1895, BBAV 11582/4a, ANZ-A. 
502 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1895, 22, 50/1895, BBAV 11582/4a, 
ANZ-A; Te Aroha News. 28 August 1895, p. 2. 
503 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1895, 52/1895, BBAV 11582/4a, ANZ-A; 
Te Aroha News, 28 August 1895, p. 2, 14 September 1895, p. 2. 
504 Te Aroha News, 21 August 1895, p. 2, 31 August 1895, p. 2. 
505 See New Zealand Herald, 24 November 1887, p. 6; British Australasian, 7 November 
1895, p. 1786; Auckland Weekly News, 27 March 1897, p. 8. 
506 See Cyclopedia of New Zealand, vol. 2, p. 757. 
98 
would ask for a power of attorney, to give Reynolds ‘absolute authority’, but 
was ‘afraid nothing will come of the business’ because Mills was ‘asking an 
absurd price’.507 In writing to Mills enclosing the power of attorney to be 
signed, Russell noted that in the deed of option Mills had  
 
set out the consideration to which you are entitled. This will not 
of course be the only consideration Mr Reynolds will expect to 
receive from a London purchaser. If then he asks say double the 
amount shown in the deed some difficulty may be experienced in 
dealing with a purchaser,  
 
thereby suggesting that the ‘absurd price’ would be absurdly doubled 
to enable Reynolds to obtain a large commission. Although Mills was told 
that the power of attorney gave Reynolds ‘a free hand as regards a 
purchaser, though of course he would still be bound to you on the other 
deed’,508 Mills objected to Reynolds having this authority, and refused to 
sign it. Russell complained that ‘with such an impractical man nothing can 
be done’, and considered that it was unlikely that the properties would be 
floated by Reynolds, ‘considering the document he has got and the peculiar 
state of the Money market’.509 Eventually Mills did sign, and Russell 
explained the delay to Reynolds as being caused by Mills objecting ‘to your 
getting anything beyond the stipulated price’. Finally Mills proposed that, 
should Reynolds get a higher price, he was entitled to keep half the extra 
amount.510  
The Auckland press, unaware of these complications, announced in 
February 1896 that negotiations were ‘in a very forward state, and 
notification by cable of the successful completion may arrive any day’. As 
the terms were ‘extremely favourable to the vendors’, the majority of whom 
were residents of Te Aroha and Waiorongomai, ‘a large amount of money 
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will be distributed in the district’.511 No doubt in part because potential 
investors were aware of how ‘extremely favourable’ to the sellers the terms 
were, a decision took some months. Late in May, Mills applied for another 
six months’ protection of the Seddon Special Claim, occupied but not worked 
since November, and to work the Cadman Licensed Holding with two 
instead of ten men for four months, because both were ‘under offer to Anglo-
Continental G M Syndicate’.512 This company had agreed to pay the vendors 
£10,000 in cash plus 20,000 paid up shares, but this was dependent on the 
results of a two months’ trial.513 One newspaper considered that, as the 
ground had ‘a good record’, there was ‘little doubt that the transaction will 
be speedily completed’.514 The nominal capital of the proposed company was 
£150,000; typically, the working capital was to be £15,000.515  
After testing the property, the Anglo-Continental did not take up its 
option. The Cadman Prospecting Association continued testing, and in 
February 1897 announced ‘a wonderful find’ assaying from five to six ounces 
to the ton.516 The following month, two representatives of large financial 
corporations visited and were satisfied with the permanency of the reefs.517 
Immediately afterwards, the local manager of the London and New Zealand 
Finance Corporation took an option over the Cadman and Seddon gcround, 
a total of 90 acres. The terms of sale were typical: 
 
£300 for a six months’ option, during which the intended 
purchasers will test and thoroughly develop the ground; manning 
the ground with the required number of men; at the expiry of six 
months, should the result prove satisfactory, a further sum of 
£2700 (making £3000 in all) will be paid over. There is also a 
consideration of 20,000 shares fully paid up to £1 in a company of 
£150,000, or in proportion thereto. According to the deed of option 
the 20,000 shares are to be allotted within three months of the 
expiry of the six months’ option.518 
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A mining reporter announced that, ‘after a long period of waiting, 
during which hope sprang eternal in every shareholder’s breast, in spite of 
the many disappointments experienced’, this agreement created ‘a 
reasonable prospect of one of our best known local mining properties being 
taken in hand by foreign capitalists’. Negotiations had been in progress ‘for 
some time past’, and during the partial protection of recent months 60 to 80 
pounds of ‘very rich specimens showing gold freely’ were found; ten pounds 
was to be exhibited in the corporation’s London office to tempt investors. 
‘Naturally, the news of the option being taken up, was received with great 
satisfaction by the shareholders’.519 During the six months spent driving 
towards the reef under the supervision of a mine manager with ‘large 
American, Continental, and Colonial experience’ and Quentin McConnell, 
the corporation’s consulting engineer,520 shareholders were confident the 
claims would be sold and retained their shares.521 The Te Aroha News wrote 
that the adit was intended ‘to crosscut several of the famous lodes’, and that 
there was ‘not the slightest doubt that the ultimate results of the 
investments now being pursued will be of a favourable character’.522  
In July, the executive committee of the shareholders was asked to 
extend the option for another six months, which was agreed to 
unanimously.523 The reason for this extension was the ‘indefiniteness of the 
results attending the development work up to date with regard to the lodes 
living down’.524 McConnell had discovered that previous miners had ‘picked 
the eyes’ out of the chutes and pockets containing gold. If the two new low 
levels proved that the ore went down he would recommend purchase, for his 
‘very exhaustive experiments’ had convinced him that it could be treated 
profitably. As the country was ‘very hard’, progress in the low levels was 
‘both slow and expensive’; the ore was ‘very kindly looking’ and free milling 
but produced ‘but little gold by assay or panning’.525 The director of the 
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corporation visited at the end of August;526 as a result, the option-holders 
shut down the mine, throwing ‘a considerable number of men out of 
work’.527 They had reached the Waitoki lode, but had not driven along it,528 
presumably because its value at depth was too low. Mills’ response to this 
disappointing outcome of two years of negotiations was to apply for the 
ground himself, promising to invest £5,000,529 which he did not have, for 
when he died in 1910 his estate was £464 4s 6d.530 The £5,000 would have 
been provided by a syndicate which must have been associated with his 
taking over the property again. Eight months later, he surrendered the 
ground.531  
Vendors did not change their behaviour during the depression of the 
1930s. An article published in 1935 in the New Zealand Financial Times, in 
referring to engineers inspecting options for English and Australian mining 
interests, noted that ‘the results have not been exciting, largely owing to 
prices demanded by option-holders’. There was a ‘fatuous idea’ that overseas 
interests were ‘prepared to pay any price’ to ‘secure areas which would 
justify the flotation of a company’: 
 
That may be true of a certain class of company promoter, but the 
larger and better-class concerns with a reputation to maintain, 
are not prepared to do business on those terms. They require, in 
addition to reasonable prospects of a remunerative gold return, 
that the conditions on which a company is floated shall be 
equitable to the people who are providing the money – the 
shareholders. Heavy loadings by option-holders are not equitable 
and the desire to make easy money out of mere papers deals are 
not conducive to the interests of the mining industry. 
 
The author cited as ‘a fair and reasonable basis’ for vendors to sell 
their interests the opinion of an ‘eminent and highly qualified engineer at 
present in New Zealand, representing powerful interests’: 
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It is sufficient if the holders of the mining rights received double 
the amount they have actually expended on testing the area over 
which they hold mining rights, plus a portion of shares in the 
company to be formed. Then they share with the people who 
provide the money to work the claim … in the results. If these 
results are good then they benefit, but if not they … have at least 
had one hundred per cent return in cash on the money they have 
expended plus the shares. 
 
Many a vendor considered that if the ground was inspected the 
investors were interested ‘and therefore he has only to hold on to his price 
to get it’. The author warned that overseas company promoters did not 
expect ‘to get the benefit of money expended without cost, but that does not 
imply that they are prepared to submit to extortion’, especially because 
obtaining an option was only the first expense: 
 
The promoting company must expend money on developing or 
testing the area over which the option is held. This may cost 
thousands of pounds and involve not only the employment of 
highly-paid experts with wide experience in the latest methods of 
exploitation and treatment of areas and ores, but extensive 
testing in alluvial areas and development in reefing propositions. 
If this cost is added to the high figures asked by many vendors, it 
will be realized that every proposition would require to be a 
bonanza to recoup the original outlay, not to mention the cost of 
providing machinery and plant as well as operating costs.532 
 
BEHAVIOUR IN A BOOM TIME 
 
When the mining boom burst upon New Zealand in the mid-1890s, one 
mining correspondent noted ‘some curious features’: 
 
Boomsters had the idea that mining properties of any kind would 
sell readily to John Bull and his neighbours, and they rushed to 
get mining properties. First, all the spare ground on known 
goldfields was secured, then new country where reefs existed was 
rushed, then all sorts of country – reefs or no reefs. Crown lands, 
native reserves, timber leases were seized. This business brought 
into existence the professional pegger-out – a species peculiar to 
Auckland. The pegger-out knew, or professed to know, all the 
promising bits of country available and he could secure them. His 
stock in trade generally was a tomahawk, a miner’s right and a 
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bushel of lies. His work was to stick four or more pegs somewhere 
in the bush enclosing somewhere about a hundred acres. From 
this work he received from £5 to £50 and a quarter share in the 
claim. The tricks and dodges of the pegger-out would fill a book. 
His training in sudden swift rides or walks through the bush 
fitted him for a war scout…. 
The claims pegged out were taken in hand generally by another 
species, the mining agent. He floated the claim…. In some cases 
parts of the capital was used to prospect the claim, more often it 
was used in the first place to obtain reports from somebody who 
was posing as an authority on mining. Prospecting and reports 
were used not so much with the idea of working the claim – that, 
with the small amount of capital, was impossible – but with the 
idea of opening up the claim a bit and selling to the foreign 
capitalist. In most cases a proportion of the capital raised actually 
went into development work, and in some cases resulted in the 
claim being sold for a very handsome profit…. 
The public … did not generally realize that even if they held a 
good claim it was only good enough to sell as a prospecting 
venture to some capitalist….  
In nearly every case where the foreign capitalist bids for a claim 
he bids only on approbation. He purchases the option to buy, that 
is he will pay say £500 cash and guarantee to spend £200 per 
month for six months in prospecting, and at the end of six months 
he will buy the claim at say £5000 cash and £30,000 £1 shares; 
but if his prospecting operations do not show something 
substantial he does not buy at the end of six months, he simply 
drops the claim.533 
 
In the latter case, the foreign capital is not provided and those who 
formed the syndicate or company with the intention of selling their claim 
had made some money from giving an option but, if they genuinely believed 
in its worth were now reliant on their own resources or other local investors 
to provide capital. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Concluding his survey of mining throughout the world in the late 
nineteenth century, Welton assessed its profitability: 
 
It will have been noted that there are a few large gold-mining 
companies making considerable profits, and a good many others 
doing fairly well from a commercial point of view, but that the 
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number of failures has been large, many of which, however, have 
been brought about by paying too large a sum to the vendors 
without raising a proportionate amount of working capital or duly 
measuring the capabilities of the property to make returns. There 
may also have been some instances of ignorance of mining or 
mismanagement, but where actual work has been carried out to 
develop the properties to any extent, although the returns may 
not have been large, yet with a reduced amount of capital small 
profits might usually have been divided, and we therefore 
conclude that gold-mining is not in itself subject to excessive risks 
beyond those of many other industries if we take ordinary trouble 
to see that the matters most essential to its success are carried 
out.  
 
He hoped that the public would learn ‘to discriminate between purely 
speculative’ ventures ‘and those which present reasonable chances of 
success on a commercial basis’.534 Which was more easily said than done.  
According to a pamphlet published in 1885, mining had 
 
unfortunately produced a species of “fungus” that has gradually 
grown upon its system, and like a cancer has spread its killing 
fibres over the whole interest. I mean that army of non-producers, 
who, like vampires, have been sucking the life blood out of mining 
without endeavouring to reproduce or foster the development of 
the industry out of which they have so long lived; this class of 
men known as brokers, jobbers, gamblers and speculators in 
scrip…. Men of every trade and calling, and those who have 
broken down, or failed in any other occupation in life, think 
themselves competent to act as agents, brokers, etc, to advise the 
investment of capital in mining and to direct the operations of 
mining undertakings. It has in a good measure been through the 
impositions, ignorance, and assurance of these nondescripts that 
gold-mining has been brought to such a ruinous position. Men 
who, by a fluke, make a rise in some lucky speculation in shares, 
arrogate to themselves the position of oracles and authorities on 
the subject of mining…. Thus has the chief industry of the colony 
come under the influence and control of a set of men who for the 
most part are as ignorant of its nature or simplest principles as 
they are of astronomy, and it is not to be wondered at that mining 
becomes depressed, and such a stigma is cast upon the interest.535 
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Visiting Auckland in 1891 and finding ‘every tradesman’ expecting a 
boom, McCombie commented that most of those who bought shares cared 
‘very little whether the mine is located at the top of a tree, or at the bottom 
of the sea, provided the stock has a market value, and there is the off-
chance of “scrooping” a few pence’.536 The Hauraki Tribune fulminated that 
there were ‘no Thames speculators’, only ‘sharpers, swindlers, and jumpers, 
men who never did an honest day’s work in their lives, or possessed an 
honest gained penny of their own; and are ready for any fraud, from pitch to 
toss to men’s laughter’.537 As for Auckland speculators, one lifetime miner, 
Samuel Montgomery,538 claimed an ‘Auckland ring’ operated Thames mines 
‘solely for the aggrandizement of Auckland interests’.539 ‘Wide-awake scrip 
holders’ made more money than ‘the bona fide gold digger’.540  
Ten years later, the New Zealand Graphic was amused by efforts to 
find gold in the hills behind Wellington: 
 
The effort has been very successful – for the confidence of the 
public wherever goldmining is concerned is altogether marvelous 
– and there has been a rush for claims on the Victoria Range. 
Hitherto the amount of gold obtained is not very large, it is true; 
but then, as any Auckland man will tell you, it is quite an 
exploded notion that the success of a gold mine so far as the 
original promoters is concerned depends of the gold; or at least 
that is the smallest factor in its success. Before that there has to 
be reckoned the astuteness of the promoter, his power to draw up 
a fine prospectus, and above all the credulity of the people. That 
last is the richest of all gold mines if you have the wit to work it. 
Apparently it is an inexhaustible vein.541 
 
The Observer considered that the compositor ‘who turned 
“sharemarket” into “snaremarket” in one of the Thames papers recently had 
                                            
536 ‘Aboriginal’, ‘Auckland Notes’, Thames Advertiser, 15 April 1891, p. 2. 
537 Hauraki Tribune, n.d., cited in Thames Advertiser, 17 March 1888, p. 2. 
538 See Thames Advertiser, 6 April 1874, p. 3, Warden’s Court, 14 January 1875, p. 3, 25 
December 1876, p. 3, Magistrate’s Court, 6 October 1888, p. 2, 8 May 1890, p. 2, 9 May 
1890, p. 2; Thames Star, Warden’s Court, 30 June 1893, p. 2, 24 August 1895, p. 3, 
Magistrate’s Court, 18 January 1896, p. 1. 
539 Thames Advertiser, 22 November 1887, p. 2. 
540 Auckland Weekly News, 20 August 1887, p. 8. 
541 New Zealand Graphic, 23 January 1897, p. 88. 
106 
a good idea of the fitness of things’.542 And it was amused by another 
Freudian slip a year and a half later: ‘The statement in a public print that a 
certain mining company was issuing 100,000 “snares,” may be true enough, 
but is not endorsed by the directors’.543 This journal always sympathized 
with the small investor, not the ‘boomster’. In 1909 it denigrated 
newspapers protecting the latter: 
 
Day after day we are reading screeds of paternal advice to the 
speculator as to the need for caution in the selection of the mining 
stocks upon which he shall carry on his gamble at the Exchange. 
Of course the gambler needs to be careful. So does any gambler. 
But the fact needs to be recognised that the people who are taking 
the principal part in the present Grand Junction boom are only 
gamblers, after all, and are mostly capable of taking care of 
themselves. They are the people who make or lose money upon 
the rise and fall of the market, and have no more real interest in 
mining that the loud-mouthed bookmakers who shout the odds at 
Ellerslie, or the folk who back horses with them…. 
Who is the actual backbone of the mining industry? Undoubtedly 
it is the person of small means in Auckland and on the goldfields 
who invests his money in prospecting ventures, and patiently 
pays his penny calls year in and year out for the proving and 
development of his mine. This is the man who really keeps the 
industry going. Through periods of dullness, when he is apt to 
become sick at heart from the constant strain upon his pockets, 
he cheerfully responds to the persistent demand for calls. Often 
he gets to the end of his resources before any return comes to 
hand from the venture. Even if gold is eventually struck it 
commonly happens that this bona fide prospector has so far 
exhausted his means that he is obliged to realise at the first 
upward move of the market. The actual reaping of profits is then 
left to the speculative boomster. 
Meanwhile this cautious person, whom the Auckland papers are 
to-day showing such anxiety to coddle, had lain low, and kept his 
money in his pockets. But as soon as the mine is proved an 
assured investment by the enterprise of the prospector, he rushes 
the market, “bulls” the shares up to a possibly fictitious value, 
and gambles with the property at prices which put it quite beyond 
the reach of the original owner. Such, in brief, is the history of 
dozens of mines on the Hauraki peninsula.544 
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It also quoted the Thames Advertiser’s view, which could be 
summarized as, ‘Investor, beware’: 
 
A man whose word would be his bond in any other business in life 
will be as crooked as a horse coper [horse-dealer] where mining is 
concerned…. It is inherent in the subject. But there is little 
concealment in the matter. Everyone who dabbles in mining must 
take the fortunes of war. He knows, or ought to know, the whole 
thing is a gamble, and that the last in will have to pay the 
piper.545 
 
The Thames Star considered that it was impossible to stop speculation 
because of the ‘innate love for gambling’.546 To the Observer, gambling was 
‘without doubt the curse of the colonies’, for 25 per cent of business failures 
were caused by ‘its pernicious influences’.547 Arthur Pentland, a Canadian 
geologist who became a director of Norpac, wrote in 1964 that all mining 
was a gamble. ‘When I examine a property for the first time I rate it as a 
“good gamble” or a “fair gamble” or a “poor gamble” ’. Anyone who went in 
for mining shares ‘must be prepared to accept much greater risks in the 
hope of much greater dividends’ than from bonds or mortgages.548 The 
Observer considered Thomas Gavin’s ‘notion’ that mining could become a 
legitimate business rather than a gamble ‘rather refreshing’,549 and joked 
about the consequences. ‘E.F. writes to ask if there is any money in gold-
mining. Yes, E.F., we are inclined to believe there is – a great deal more 
money in it than will ever come out of it’.550 In 1929, it wrote about 
investors’ ‘fever’:  
 
Once touched with the goldmining investment fever, and you are 
a gonner…. Investors in mining ventures get stung and stung, 
and yet the little tale of reefs and specimens showing gold freely, 
another hundred feet of driving, and the Ajax reef or 
Moanataiari’s richest lode will be reached, and off goes the 
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optimist, and is tagged on to periodical calls until another 
reconstruction.551 
 
McCombie complained that nobody would take ‘a common sense view 
of the industry and deal with it accordingly’. Goldmining appeared to be the 
only trade requiring ‘no previous training, experience, or apprenticeship, 
and therefore skim milk masquerades as cream right along the line’. He 
attacked ‘the grasping greed of directors and shareholders generally’: 
 
Their inordinate desire to accumulate filthy lucre speedily 
induces them to invest in gold mining, which they do not look 
upon as being a legitimate branch of industry, but, trusting to 
scrip market fluctuations to see them out of the right side of the 
ledger, they embark their capital in all sorts of wild schemes. 
 
Whereas people attributed most failures ‘to the uncertainty of that 
industry’, he considered that these were caused by ‘the ignorance of 
investors, combined with the rotten reckless system under which new 
mines’ were discovered and old ones explored. He wanted the warden to 
have the power to refuse leases to those who could not prove they had a 
reef.552  
In 1872, a journalist told the story of one man who tried to make 
money, heavily underlining the moral: 
 
I met an old acquaintance of mine yesterday whom I knew at one 
time to be among the best farm servants in the colony. He had 
forsaken the plough and had gone into the mining-share business. 
He accosted me in the street for the object of obtaining a small 
loan to relieve his cravings for a pint of beer. Then he told me his 
troubles. Eighteen months ago he left honest employment and 
took to jobbing in mining shares. He had commenced with ten 
pounds, and, as I have shown, ended by borrowing sixpence. But, 
between the time of these extremes in life, he had, by rigging the 
market, and by watching what was being done by the knowing 
ones, come to be worth £3,000 good, every penny of which he told 
me he had lost again. “And,” I said, “is it not quite right that it 
should be with you as it is? Share-jobbing is just so much playing 
at unlimited loo [otherwise Lanterloo, a card game].553 You put so 
much in the pool, and it depends upon the chance turn of a card 
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whether you draw the stakes or lose what you have risked. You 
buy shares in claims of the value of which you know nothing, or 
care nothing, if you can only sell at a profit. You don’t invest with 
a desire to make a fair gain from the dividends a mine may pay. 
That would be too slow a process. It would be legitimate dealing, 
which is not in your line or the line of those like you. If such were 
your object you would, before parting with your own money, 
ascertain the nature and value of the claim you were investing in. 
But you buy to-day what you fancy will fetch you more to-morrow. 
Why it is likely to fetch you more you have no reason to give to 
yourself or anybody else. You live in a state of mental fever and 
excitement, which unfits you for the dull routine of honest 
pursuits. To-day you may be worth hundreds; the next week you 
are penniless; and to retrieve your disappointment you scheme 
and shuffle, and swindle any innocent, credulous man or woman 
who may come in your way. You become demoralised, and you 
cause the infection to spread until the whole community in which 
you reside is impregnated with an atmosphere of commercial 
immorality. The state of the poor miner who is toiling and 
sweating in the bowels of an unwholesome mine for a miserable 
pay you never think of. The hardy, patient, laborious prospector, 
who is the discoverer of so much golden wealth, is simply cheated 
out of his discovery, and cast out into the cold. You get up 
companies upon all kinds of falsehoods and fictitious 
representations. You care not who suffers or who may be ruined. 
The wife may see her husband divested of every penny he 
possessed, and her children with penury staring them in the face. 
But what care you, so long as you can bull or bear the market at 
the expense of your common honesty? And how does it all end? 
You experience a temporary floating prosperity, and then you are 
at the last reduced to what you are now doing – depending on an 
acquaintance for the loan of a sixpence, which you will never 
repay; for you are too far gone to turn again and labour honestly 
by the sweat of your brow. It matters little what becomes of you 
individually; but it does matter a great deal to those who are, and 
have been, the victims of professional mining jobbers.”554 
 
No response to this homily was recorded; an 1875 letter confirmed that 
it was a typical view of those who made their living by share manipulation: 
 
It is a fact not to be questioned that there is more swindling in 
mining speculations than in almost any other form of speculation. 
Stocks are constantly put upon the market which represent no 
ascertained values and no developed mines; and mines of known 
value are often managed without the slightest regard to the 
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interest of the stockholders; without any view of honestly taking 
out ore and declaring dividends, but simply for speculative 
purposes, and to enable the managers to enrich themselves by 
dishonest means.555 
 
The Thames Star noted how the market often rose when returns were 
poor, and that the prospects of mines had ‘but little bearing on the market 
and the value of shares’ because of manipulation of investors ‘by specious 
words and misleading statements’. It regretted that the sharemarket was 
no longer subservient to the mining industry and that the ‘mercenary scrip-
jobber’ was subverting the interests of mining.556  
According to one mining agent, ‘not 5% of those who contribute to 
Mining get any return’.557 But there was always the hope of making a 
fortune, encouraged by tales of ‘what might have been’; for instance, of an 
investor taking his wife’s advice and refraining from investing in the 
Shotover mine at Thames, thereby missing out on a fortune.558 There were 
also cautionary examples: in 1909 a dentist committed suicide because of 
failed mining speculations.559 In a bankruptcy case, a judge stated that ‘no 
gambling transaction had greater risk than speculation in mining shares. 
As far as his knowledge went there was not one in a hundred who made 
much out of these speculations’.560 An Australian newspaper argued, in 
1889, that if investors did not benefit, the country did.561 Certainly 
Auckland before the Thames goldfield opened was in a parlous economic 
state.562  
The Mining Journal of London argued against the view that mining 
shares were ‘an extremely precarious sort of investment’. The ‘knowing 
investor’ could select the best on offer and had ‘an excellent chance of 
finding a few failures more than compensated for by the successes of the 
good concerns’. It considered that these investments were ‘probably as safe 
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and more remunerative than a good many purely industrial undertakings, 
whose balance-sheets show invariable profits every year’.563 
According to one editorial, the apathy of shareholders meant they were 
to blame if their investments failed, as indicated by attendance at company 
meetings: 
 
Scarcely more than half a dozen shareholders are present at nine-
tenths of the meetings held. Meetings are delayed in order that 
the requisite number of shareholders may be present; but the 
same old verdict is returned, and “lapsed for want of a quorum” is 
once more recorded. If the meeting which has fallen through is a 
half-yearly one then the business will “be read that day six 
months”…. By and by manifest errors are discovered in the 
management, the balance sheet “won’t work,” and the 
shareholders yell for justice and explanations. Who is to blame? If 
shareholders themselves are not alive to their own interests, can 
they expect anyone else to be? They are astonished at the large 
items appearing as office expenses, directors’ fees, and petty cash 
in their balance sheets, and yet they are so apathetic as never to 
inquire after or show any interest in the companies in which they 
have invested capital.564 
 
The financial (and moral) fitness of many shareholders was lamented 
in 1872: 
 
The financial condition of those who make it their occupation to 
traffic in mining shares may be judged from the fact that when a 
company is wound up, and shareholders are called upon to 
contribute, pro rata, to the extent of their unpaid shares, not 
twenty per cent of the amount can be collected by the Official 
Trustee. In the case of the Golden Gate Goldmining Company … 
it came out in evidence that Mr Warner [the liquidator] had 
caused eighteen distress warrants to issue against shareholders, 
when the whole of them had been returned by the bailiff with the 
words “nulla bona” endorsed on the back of them. That is to say, 
some £30 had been expended by the Trustee in law costs, for 
which not one penny had been received in return. The share-
dabblers had either become insolvent, had fled the province, or 
did not possess one pennyworth of assets. Men it transpired 
bought shares, altogether heedless of what calls were liable to be 
made on them, speculating on the bare possibility that before the 
time arrived the market would rise, when they would be able to 
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dispose of them to some poor greenhorn, ignorant of the 
responsibility he was taking upon himself…. Men never for a 
moment allowed themselves to take into consideration whether a 
mine was likely to prove rich or worthless. Their whole idea was 
to buy in at some price or other, in order to sell out at an advance. 
It mattered little to those who were ruined, and how dire might 
be the consequence. Homes were made wretched, wives and 
children became destitute, and a widespread misery was incurred 
by this heartless, reckless trafficking in shares. A large 
proportion of those speculators had no means of their own, and 
when it happened, as it so often did happen, that a mine ceased to 
pay its working expenses after the subscribed capital had melted 
away, the onus of paying off the liabilities of the company fell 
altogether upon the few solvent shareholders whom the law could 
lay its grip upon. There is also another black feature connected 
with many of these mines which have been wound up by the 
machinery of law. There is the disreputable means, not to apply a 
harsher term, objectors use to have their names struck off the list 
of contributories. There is nothing many of these will not swear to 
to be relieved from their responsibility. A man who has bought 
shares, who has received his transfer, and whose name has been 
registered on a company’s book, will come into Court, and, kissing 
the Bible, will swear that he never did buy shares; that he never 
received any transfer; and that he was quite ignorant how his 
name came to be placed on the register. Sometimes the line of 
defence is changed. A registered shareholder will say the shares 
were offered to him by a friend leaving the colony, but that he 
refused having anything to do with them. Others will actually 
deny their own identity; will depose that they are not the John 
Smith, or the James Jones, or the Thomas Robinson mentioned in 
the trustee’s schedule. But had the mine, instead of becoming 
insolvent, turned out a good dividend-paying claim, there is no 
extreme course these men would not adopt to show that they were 
the real bona fide shareholders; that they had bought the shares, 
had paid for them, had never parted with them, and had never 
intended so doing…. One of our most able barristers remarked … 
that the present trafficking in shares by men who had got nothing 
to lose, but might be an accidental turn in the market have much 
to gain, caused a large amount of demoralised feeling in our 
midst.565 
 
An Englishman described the whole picture much more concisely. 
‘Colonials seem to have very hazy ideas of sound financial principles, and … 
they look on mining as a field for pure gambling and speculation, the main 
idea being to make money by the rise and fall of the shares rather than by 
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the dividends they yield’.566 This was hardly unique to colonials. Curle’s 
criticism of company flotations was directed at the London market: 
 
It may be said that three-quarters of all transactions in mining 
shares come under the head of gambling, pure and simple. The 
average gambler in mines cares nothing for the intrinsic value of 
a property; he does not study its past history; he does not intend 
to hold the shares for dividends – in fact, he wants to know 
nothing about the mine. All he asks for is a large profit on his 
speculation in a minimum period, and, credulous and greedy as 
he is, jumps eagerly at the first source of information that comes 
to his hand.567 
 
He advised investors to ‘be satisfied with a reasonable or even a small 
profit’.568 The Thames Star warned during a small share boom in 1904 that 
people were forgetting earlier lessons and the motto ‘small profits and quick 
returns’. It advised that the man who bought in at 1s and was ‘content to 
double his money is seldom left, but the one who always waits for the top of 
the market usually misses the ’bus’.569 
In 1893 the Observer published a brief joke about speculating: ‘I hear 
your mining venture was not very successful. Didn’t you get anything out of 
it?’ ‘Oh yes, I got experience and the sympathy of my friends’.570 A much 
longer satirical comment, allegedly a report from ‘Dunn Brown’, meaning 
someone who had been ‘thoroughly deceived, cheated, or fooled’,571 about a 
meeting of the Diddlum Mining Company, Limited, published in 1887 in the 
London Mining Journal, was reproduced by the Thames Star: 
 
The annual meeting of this company took place yesterday, Mr 
McSquirt in the chair. 
The Chairman said he had much pleasure in meeting them all 
again. The accounts would be laid before them, and they would 
see there was still a cash balance in hand, which he hoped to 
further reduce by voting a small increase to the salaries of their 
directors. (Feeble cheers). He had little to add to the very full 
reports that appeared every few months in the papers, but he 
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might refer to a report – a ridiculous report, he might say – to the 
effect that toothache had broken out among the miners. 
(Sensation). He lost no time in communicating with the manager, 
who immediately cabled “stopped,” which, whether it referred to 
the teeth, the toothache, or the mine, was eminently satisfactory. 
(Cheers). They would be glad to hear that shafts and capital were 
being sunk together, and that the ventilation, which was a 
system of their own, gave the men a complete change of air every 
few weeks. (Loud cheers). He would be pleased to answer any 
questions that were not too embarrassing. 
A Shareholder: Is it true that some traces of gold have been 
found? – The Chairman (severely): I am glad the question has 
been raised. No, sir, it is not true, and I can only suppose that 
such a report has been circulated with the idea of injuring the 
company in the eyes of the public. 
Mr Seagull: Is the mine still promising? – The Chairman 
(warmly): Never more so. (Shareholders were seen to congratulate 
each other.) Certainly as much so as on the date of their first 
meeting 25 years ago. 
Mr Nagg: I should like to hear some reference to “winzes,” 
“levels,” “stopes,” “the crosscut,” “drives,” “mineral,” “pyrites,” and 
“cleaning up.” These matters are purest Greek to me, and 
possibly to the meeting, but we all like to feel that our property is 
still producing them. (Hear, hear.) 
Chairman: If Mr Nagg will allow me to say so, these are all 
alluded to in the printed report. 
Mr Smelarat: I am glad to hear the Chairman say so, and I must 
thank Mr Nagg for calling attention to it. Some companies tried 
to be popular with the public by pretending to give an estimate of 
profits over working expenses – (shame) – and some even went so 
far as to declare a small dividend. (Cries of “Name.”) In these 
days of action for libel he would refrain from mentioning names. 
(Hear, hear.) 
Mr Algush: I think I express the sense of the meeting in moving a 
vote of thanks to our worthy and respected Chairman. (Cheers). 
Perhaps some few will share with me a slight feeling of 
disappointment that no “call” has been made or is thought 
necessary, but in the words of one of our great statesmen, rest 
assured “The time will come!” (Applause.) When they compared 
the harmony of their meetings with the excited and sultry 
debates that took place at other meetings, they would agree with 
him that they had much to be thankful for. Of course they, as a 
company, had had to pass through similar experiences, and many 
of them would doubtless remember those early days when the 
stone was said to have “dabs of gold,” when the judgment sat 
warped and cross eyed before the splendid achievements of some 
new “rock drill,” and strong minds tottered as they declared 
imaginary dividends from “tailings.” (Loud cheers). But, 
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gentlemen, those days are gone, and we can afford a smile. (Some 
interruption was caused by someone who was understood to say 
that that was about all they could afford). As I was saying, 
gentlemen, we can afford to smile. (Great interruption, and the 
Chairman said that as there seemed to be considerable difference 
of opinion, perhaps Mr Algush would not insist of that point). 
Mr Algush: Very well, sir, I call upon someone to second the 
motion. This was done, and the meeting, like the capital, 
gradually dissolved.572 
 
To conclude, the reason why there was far more information about 
dubious if not outright immoral practices in floating and operating 
companies than of ethical behaviour was because there was far more of the 
former. 
 
Appendix 
 
Figure 1: ‘Advice to Mining Investors: Beware of the Wild Cat’, 
Auckland Weekly New, 22 July 1909, Supplement, p. 14. 
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